





Faculty of Law 
Autonomous weapon systems that decide whom to kill  
How international humanitarian law and international human rights law regulate the 
development and use of offensive autonomous weapon systems during international 
armed conflicts 
— 
Erika Steinholt Mortensen 




TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................................................... 4 
1.1. Methodology and sources ........................................................................................................ 7 
1.2. Scope and structure of the thesis ........................................................................................... 11 
 
2. Actuality and definition of autonomous weapon systems .................................................................... 14 
2.1. Historical background of autonomous weapon systems........................................................ 14 
2.2. Actuality of the thesis ............................................................................................................ 15 
2.3. Defining autonomy ................................................................................................................ 16 
2.4. Dimensions of autonomy ....................................................................................................... 18 
2.4.1. The loop .................................................................................................................................................. 18 
2.4.2. Complexity of the machine: is it automated, autonomous or intelligent? .......................... 19 
2.4.3. The tasks the weapon system performs ......................................................................................... 20 
2.5. Autonomy in current weapon systems .................................................................................. 21 
2.5.1. Offensive weapon systems with autonomy ................................................................................. 22 
2.5.2. Artificial deep-learning and ethical governing ........................................................................... 24 
2.5.3. Meaningful human control as a key requirement ...................................................................... 25 
2.6. Preliminary conclusion .......................................................................................................... 26 
 
3. The impact of human rights law when states use autonomous weapon systems in 
international armed conflicts ..................................................................................................................................... 28 
3.1. The standing of international human rights law in international armed conflicts ................. 28 
3.1.1. The inter-relationship between international human rights and international 
humanitarian law ..................................................................................................................................................... 30 
3.1.2. Jurisdiction ............................................................................................................................................. 33 
3.1.2.1. Extraterritorial application of the ICCPR ............................................................. 34 
3.1.2.2. Extraterritorial application of the ECHR .............................................................. 35 
3.2. Does the right to life limit the use of autonomous weapon systems in international armed 
conflicts? ........................................................................................................................................... 38 
3.2.1. The obligation to protect the right to life during international armed conflicts ............... 39 
3.2.2. Justifiable deprivation of life ............................................................................................................ 43 
3.3. Does the prohibition against torture or inhuman treatment limit the use of autonomous 








4. How international humanitarian law regulate the use of autonomous weapon systems in 
international armed conflicts ..................................................................................................................................... 50 
4.1. When does the conflict amount to an international armed conflict? ..................................... 50 
4.2. The balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations ........................... 52 
4.3. The legality of autonomous weapon system under international humanitarian law ............. 54 
4.3.1. Analogous interpretation of the CCW Protocol II ..................................................................... 57 
4.3.2. The impact of the Martens Clause on international weapons law ........................................ 58 
4.3.3. Preliminary conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 58 
4.4. How the law of targeting applies on military operations conducted with autonomous weapon 
systems .............................................................................................................................................. 59 
4.4.1. Compliance with the obligation to take precautions in attacks when an attack is 
conducted with autonomous weapon systems ................................................................................................ 59 
4.4.1.1. Compliance with the principle of distinction when an attack is conducted 
with autonomous weapon systems .............................................................................................. 61 
4.4.1.1.1. Identification of military objects ...................................................................... 61 
4.4.1.1.2. Identification of lawful combatants ................................................................. 62 
4.4.1.1.3. The issue concerning civilians directly participating in hostilities ......... 64 
4.4.1.2. Compliance with the principle of proportionality when an attack is 
conducted with autonomous weapon systems ......................................................................... 67 
4.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 69 
 
5. The obligation to conduct weapon reviews ................................................................................................ 70 
5.1. Application of Article 36 ....................................................................................................... 72 
5.2. The obligation to determine the legality of autonomous weapon systems ............................ 73 
5.3. Preliminary conclusion: Review of autonomous weapon systems ........................................ 75 
 
6. Final remarks ......................................................................................................................................................... 76 
 
Sources ................................................................................................................................................................................. 77 
 
All predictions agree that if man does not master technology, but allows technology to 
master him, he will be destroyed by technology.1 
 
 The current moment may be the best we will have to address these concerns.2 
                                                        
1 Pilloud, C., Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. and Zimmermann, B. (1987). Commentary on the additional protocols 
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
Cross. 
2 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary of arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 





A characteristic of modern warfare is that an increasing number of remotely controlled and 
unmanned weapon systems are employed in military operations. Imagine that you are seated 
in the Nevada desert, yet that you operate an unmanned combat aerial vehicle3 (UCAV) that is 
about to enter the combat zone in Syria to fight against Daesh.4 Your UCAV is equipped with 
functions permitting it to take decisions without an explicit order from you, including the 
ability to identify a pre-programmed target which it will engage unless you abort the mission 
on time – it is a so-called autonomous weapon system (AWS).5 You have noted that the 
international community is discussing whether the increasing use of autonomy in weapon 
systems are lowering the threshold that usually refrains states from engaging in armed 
conflict. You are nevertheless personally convinced that your AWS with precision guiding 
features is more discriminate and precise when it engages and attacks – and therefore, you 
feel secure that the number of civilian casualties will be low.  
 
However, you cannot help but thinking that it is easier now, as your own armed forces 
potential risk is about zero, to carry out attacks. You also admit to yourself that the number of 
civilian casualties is increasing in the same manner as the number of attacks.6 Anyway, your 
intention is to act in accordance with international as well as national law and the rules of 
engagement – hereunder ensure that the number of civilian losses is not excessive. Thus, as 
the weapon is accepted and tested before the operation, you shoo away your worries.  
 
The AWS arrives at the destination, and starts to seek after the target. As the AWS 
approaches it, you realize that the interface is too comprehensive for you to fully understand 
what is going on in its software. Consequently, the operation may fail because of one of the 
following scenarios: 
 
                                                        
3 According to the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Bern, 15 May 2009 (HPCR Manual) Section A Article 
1(ee), UCAVs mean "an unmanned military aircraft of any size which carries and launches a weapon, or which 
can use on-board technology to direct such a weapon to target." 
4 Daesh – also known as the Islamic State – is a jihadist militant group.  
5 See section 2.4. 




i. The enemy hacks the communication link between you and the AWS, and sends it 
"your" way – that is, in direction of the site of your armed forces.7 
ii. The system malfunctions and sends its missile against a crowded playground with 
families, including many children.  
iii. The AWS mistakes a group of civilians for being the enemy. As you trust the system 
and doubt your independent judgment, it engages.  
iv. The missile – equipped with so-called fire and forget technology8 – does not 
understand that the enemy has surrendered and engages anyway. 
 
Other scenarios may play out where the system is equipped with artificial intelligence,9 and 
the ability to learn and reason. In such cases, decisions over life, death and destruction are 
fully in the "hands" of the system, thus challenging both IHL and the military chain of 
command.10 
 
Although made up, the above-mentioned scenarios are rooted in reality. The nature of armed 
conflict is rapidly changing as technological developments are leading to new means and 
methods of warfare11 and the technological features advance in an exponential manner.12 An 
example of new means are military robotic weapons,13 including autonomous weapon 
systems, which are the subjects of examination in this thesis. 
 
 
                                                        
7 Defense Update, K-MAX Crashes on a Mission in Afghanistan, June 17, 2013. 
8 A term referring to a missile that is able to guide itself to its target due to multiple sensor systems. Oxford 
Dictionaries, see link: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/fire-and-forget (last entered April 2, 
2016). 
9 See section 2.5.2.  
10 Roff, Heather M., The Strategic Robot Problem: Lethal Autonomous Weapons in War, Journal of Military 
Ethics (2014), 13:3,211-227, DOI: 10.1080/15027570.2014.975010. 
11 According to the HPCR Manual (2009), "means of warfare" mean "weapons, weapon systems or platforms 
employed for the purposes of attack." "Methods of warfare" mean "attacks and other activities designed to 
adversely affect the enemy's military operations or military capacity, as distinct from the means of warfare used 
during military operations, such as weapons. In military terms, methods of warfare consist of the various general 
categories of operations, such as bombing, as well as the specific tactics used for attack, such as high altitude 
bombing." 
12 Peter Singer, Wired for War, Penguin 2009, page 97. 
13 Leveringhaus, A. and Gilles Giacca, Robo-Wars: The Regulation of Robotic Weapons, Oxford Martin Policy 
Papers, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, 2014, page 5. 
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AWS have become popular means of warfare. By employing them in combat, the military 
creates an advantageous distance between weapon and soldier.14 Thus, the militaries are able 
to improve the safety of the operator and minimize the risks for the soldiers which an armed 
conflict normally brings about. In addition, use of AWS lower the operational costs, 
personnel requirements and rely less on communication links than remotely controlled 
UCAVs.15 
 
Although such technologies are clearly benefitting those possessing them, the international 
community discusses the legal and ethical implications of the development and use of AWS 
in a military context.16 These issues are so-called "hot potatoes", and opinions range from a 
total ban on further development17 to opposition to any such restrictions.18 Between these 
extremes, the United Nations' (UN) Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns has urged the Human 
Rights Council to call on all States to “declare and implement a national moratoria on at least 
the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment and use of LARs until 
such time as an internationally agreed upon framework on the future of LARs has been 
established”.19 Thus, he called for a pause in the development of AWS in order to allow the 
international community to discuss the issues.20 
 
One of the concerns relate to whether militaries using AWS will be able to comply with 
fundamental principles21 and other rules of IHL – otherwise potentially weakening the rule of 
international law.22 Another is that the deployment of AWS will obscure the rules of 
accountability.23 Ethically speaking, there is a fear that without a human cost in armed 
                                                        
14 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary of arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 
A/HRC/23/47, April 2013, page 8 paragraph 26 and 27. 
15 Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting on “Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and 
humanitarian aspects”, 26-28 March 2014, Geneva, page 1.  
16 The UN CCW meeting of experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems discussed this subject in April 
2015 and 2016. 
17 The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots; Human Rights Watch, Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for 
Killer Robots, April 9, 2015, p. 11. 
18 The Guardian, UK opposes international ban on developing killer robots, April 13, 2015.  
19 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary of arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 
A/HRC/23/47, April 2013, page 8 paragraph 33. LAR is an abbreviation of Lethal Autonomous Robotics. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See chapter 4. 
22 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary of arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 
A/HRC/23/47, April 2013, page 8 paragraph 58; The Geneva Academy, Academy Briefing No. 8, Autonomous 
Weapon Systems under International Law, November 2014 page 9; P. W. Singer, page 323; HRW: Losing 
Humanity, page 6 paragraphs 30-31. 
23 HRW: Mind the Gap. 
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conflicts, possession of AWS might lower the threshold for a State to resort to force against 
another.24 In addition, the potential development of weapon systems capable of selecting and 
engaging targets without neither human programming nor intervention25 creates a chilling 
prospect of robotics deciding who lives and who dies. 
 
Skepticism aside, automation of various tasks is not only a trend26 in military contexts, but 
also in civilian homes27 and work places.28 Thus, there is clearly a positive attitude towards 
robotics in the international society. In the military context, what is important is that robotics 
seem to be indispensable to modern warfare,29 creating the impression that a general 
prohibition is quite farfetched: states will presumably not backtrack once the technology is 
available.  
 
A more pragmatic approach is to insist on AWS having to be developed and used in a manner 
consistent with international law, thus only banning weapon systems not capable of meeting 
the current requirements. Hence, states developing or using new weapons will have to comply 
with existing laws, and adjust the progress thereafter. The overarching questions are to what 
extent international humanitarian law (IHL) deems AWS unlawful, or, if they are legal per se, 
how international human rights law (IHRL) and the law of targeting regulate the conduct of 
hostilities when these weapons are used during an international armed conflict (IAC). 
 
1.1. Methodology and sources 
 
As this thesis concerns international law, it requires a different methodical approach than 
national law: there does exist neither any universally established methodical structure,30 nor a 
legislature common to all states or any binding executive or enforcing institutions.31 The lack 
                                                        
24 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary of arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 
A/HRC/23/47, April 2013, page 8 paragraph 58; The Geneva Academy, Academy Briefing No. 8, Autonomous 
Weapon Systems under International Law, November 2014 page 9; Singer, page 323; HRW: Losing Humanity, 
page 4. 
25 HRW: Losing Humanity, page 2; The US Department of Defense Directive, Number 3000.09, November 21, 
2012, page 13-14. 
26 Singer (2009), page 7-8 
27 CNN.no, CES 2015: The robots moving in to your house, January 8, 2015. 
28 International Business Times, BBC releases list of employees at risk at being replaced by robots, September 
17, 2015.  
29 Singer (2009), page 23. 
30 Shaw, M. N. (7th edition, 2014). International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, page 49 
31 Shaw (2014), page 49. 
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of these features is a natural consequence of the principle that all states are inherently 
sovereign and with an equal legal position.32  
 
However, as the Statutes of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Article 38 is generally 
recognized to express the sources of international law, international law does not apply in a 
vacuum.33 The provision reads as follows: 
 
“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply: 
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.” 34 
 
In contrast to municipal law, international law is organized as a horizontal system. This 
means that there is, in principle, no hierarchy of sources or rules except where peremptory 
norms – jus cogens – prohibits derogation, thus creating a vertical dimension.35 However, 
letters a-c are viewed as the exclusive law-making sources of international law,36 whereas 
judicial decisions and expert teachings mainly operate as additional tools for interpretation. 
The latter categories may also contribute to the formulation of new law where the primary 
sources do not provide a clear answer.37  
 
                                                        
32 Shaw (2014), page 4. 
33 Ruud, M. and Ulfstein, G. (4th edition, 2011). Innføring i folkerett. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, page 66. 
34 Statute of the International Court of Justice – 26 June 1945, Article 38 first paragraph. 
35 Antonio Cassese, International Law, Second edition (Oxford University Press, 2005), page 198-99; Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 23 May 1969 Article 53. Jus cogens are norms "accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character". 
36 Shaw (2014), 50. 
37 Shaw (2014), 82. 
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) Articles 31-3238 contain the basic 
rules for interpretation of treaties, and are generally recognized as customary law.39 
According to Article 31, treaties must be interpreted in accordance with the universal 
principles of free consent and good faith, meaning that one has to seek the “ordinary meaning 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.40  
 
As not all states have ratified every treaty and protocol and because some of the conventions 
have a limited territorial scope, states' specific treaty obligations are relative. Thus, customary 
law is of major significance in the present thesis. A rule will be considered “evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law” and achieve status as customary law when it qualifies as 
both state practice and opinio juris.41 This means that the content of the custom must reflect 
the actual conduct of a number of states42 and that each state is motivated by a belief that the 
conduct is in accordance with a legal obligation or entitlement,43 and not political or moral 
motives.44 Whether or not the practice is sufficient depends on the circumstances of the 
specific case, the nature of the usage in question45 and any opposition to the alleged rule.46  
 
If neither treaty nor customary law regulate an issue, an application of general principles of 
the various municipal systems may close a potential legal gap.47 It is for the judges in 
international courts to decide whether they can deduce a general principle of law due to an 
analogous interpretation of existing rules or principles guiding the municipal systems.48  
 
As neither treaty nor customary law directly regulate AWS, the so-called Martens Clause (the 
Clause), whose purpose is to prevent legal gaps in cases of armed conflict where a particular 
situation is not regulated in treaty law, is worth to be noticed.49 The Clause is repeated in 
                                                        
38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 23 May 1969. 
39 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Guinea-Bissou v. Senegal, ICJ Reports 1991, p. 53, p. 70 para 48. 
40 VCLT, article 31. 
41 North-Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, Judgment of 20 February 1969.  
42 Cassese (2005), page 156-157.  
43 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para 77; Shaw (2014), page 53. 
44 Shaw (2014), p. 62-63. 
45 Shaw (2014), page 54. 
46 Shaw (2014), page 55. 
47 Shaw (2014), p. 69-70. 
48 Shaw (2014), p. 70. 
49 The ICRC has suggested that the legality of a weapon should be considered in the light of the Martens Clause 
in case it was neither regulated by a specific restriction or prohibition nor by the general rules of IHL, see A 
guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare. Measures to Implement Article 36 
of Additional Protocol I of 1977, The International Committee of the Red Cross , Geneva, January 2006. 
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numerous treaty provisions and preambles,50 such as in AP I Article 1(2), where the Clause 
reads as follows: 
 
"civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of 
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from 
the dictates of public conscience."51  
 
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
Clause demands that, where a rule of IHL is not sufficiently clear, “the scope and purport of 
the rule must be defined with reference to those principles and dictates."52 Both ICTY and 
authors call for a cautious application of the Clause,53 as it does not "constitute additional 
standards for judging the legality of means and methods of warfare.”54  
 
However, the Clause may put pressure on the interpretation of a potentially customary norm 
and may ease the demand of consistent state practice if the opinio juris is sufficiently strong.55 
In the words of ICTY: “principles of international humanitarian law may emerge through a 
customary process under the pressure of the demands of humanity or the dictates of public 
conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent.”56 Given the public interest and 
campaigns against AWS, the Clause may prove significant in the discussion concerning the 
legality of such weapons.  
 
In respect of the ECHR, the jurisdiction of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) 
extends "to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the 
                                                        
It is, however, not likely that states will interpret the Clause in such a progressive manner. 
50 AP I Article 1(2); The Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II and the 1907 Hague Convention IV 
containing the Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 8th passage; Preamble of the CCW 6th 
passage; GC I/II/III/IV Articles 63/62/142/158 (denunciation). 
51 Pilloud, C., Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. and Zimmermann, B. (1987). Commentary on the additional protocols 
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
Cross (Commentary on AP I), paragraph 56 and footnote 29. 
52 Kupreškić case, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, p. 206 para 525. 
53 Boothby (2014), page 89. 
54 Dinstein Y. (2nd edition, 2010), The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, page 9 
55 Kupreškić case, p. 209, para 531. 
56 Kupreškić case, p. 207, para 527. 
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protocols thereto."57 The ECtHR plays a crucial role in the evolution of the rights and 
freedoms. It has determined, inter alia, that the ECHR must be regarded as "a living 
instrument which […] must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions."58 Alongside 
this guiding principle of interpretation, the ECtHR has identified the object and purpose of the 
ECHR as "the protection of individual human beings."59 Seen together, these notions of 
interpretation may place the ECtHR in a dilemma where a normalization of new technologies 
and advanced weapon systems challenge the traditional way of thinking about protection of 
individuals. This may be the case where the targeting decision is taken by a machine, and not 
by a human. 
 
Inherent in the whole of the ECHR is “a search for a fair balance60 between the demands of 
the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the 
individual's fundamental rights."61 Under this assessment, states are obliged to determine 
whether an interference with a right is “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”62 Of 
importance in the following discussion, is that states have a limited margin of appreciation as 
to the proportionality test when it comes to fundamental rights as the right to life and the 
prohibition against degrading or inhuman treatment.  
 
 
1.2. Scope and structure of the thesis  
 
In the present thesis, I will examine how IHL and IHRL regulate offensive63 state conduct on 
the battlefield during an IAC. The treaties in the IHL field which are of special relevance in 
                                                        
57 The ECHR Article 32(1). On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the ICJ "comprises all cases which the parties 
refer to it and all matters specially provided for it in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and 
conventions in force", see Statute for the International Court of Justice, June 26 1945, article 36(1). 
58 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, Judgment (Merits), App. No. 5856/72, 11 March 1978, para 31. 
59 Soering v the United Kingdom, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), App. No. 14038/88, 7 July 1989 para 
87. The dictum from Soering has been repeated in several decisions, see for instance Al-Sadoon and Mufdhi v the 
United Kingdom, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), App. No. 61498/08, 2 March 2010, para 127. 
60 The fair balance principle may be seen as "a basis for assessing the proportionality of respondents' interference 
with the Convention rights of applicants and for determining when states are subject to implied positive 
obligations under the Convention," see Harris, O'Boyle & Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Third Edition (Oxford University Press, 2014), page 14. 
61 Soering v UK para 89. 
62 Handyside v the United Kingdom, Judgment (Merits), App. No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para 49; Harris, 
O'Boyle and Warbrick (2014), p. 22. 
63 Although the term “attack” includes both offensive and defensive acts of violence, I limit my assessment to 
offensive uses of AWS. 
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this thesis are the Hague Convention IV64 of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 194965 and 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP 1).66 Furthermore, the UN Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),67 which I will refer to by analogy, prohibits and 
restricts the use of certain weapons. In the IHRL domain, the right to life and the prohibition 
against degrading and inhuman treatment under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)68 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)69 poses 
interesting questions in relation to the use of AWS in IACs. In addition to these treaties, 
customary law will largely shape the discussion.  
 
To ensure a proper application of IHL, one must first assess whether the armed conflict in 
question is an international armed conflict (IAC) or a non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC).70 I will limit my discussion to IACs. The underlying premise is thus that there is a 
situation which qualifies as an "armed conflict" between two or more states.71  
 
In addition to restrictions as to which legal regime applies to a certain conflict, the relevant 
rules depend on whether the violence occurs on land, in the air or at sea. For instance, AP I 
article 4(3) states that  
 
"[t]he provisions of this section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the 
civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all 
attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the 
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air."72  
                                                        
64 Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, enacted  
65 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention (III) relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949. 
66 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), enacted 8 June 1977. 
67 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), 10 October 1980. 
68 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, enacted 4 November 1950. 
69 The United Nation’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, enacted 16 December 1966. 
70 Some argue that there is a growing convergence between the sets of rules governing IACs/NIACs, see the 
International Law Association Committee on the Use of Force, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict 
in International Law (2010) (74 Int'l L. Ass'n Rep. Conf. 676 2010), page 685. 
71 See section 4.1.  




I will focus on attacks that have effect on land, including air to ground attacks, where AP I 
applies.  
 
I will examine the right to life and the prohibition against ill-treatment with a special focus on 
ECHR Article 2 and thus only with reference to ICCPR Article 6. The reason I will 
emphasize ECHR, is that the ECtHR has developed ECHR law and expanded the material 
reach of the ECHR so that contracting states to the ECHR have more detailed and far-
reaching obligations than non-contracting states.  
 
There are also ethical, moral and strategical concerns related to AWS.73 I will focus on the 
legal aspects of AWS, and place strong limitations on any discussions of the other three 
aspects. Ethical considerations are, however, unavoidable in the present context, as they may 
have implications for the legality. I will nevertheless be cautious with the application of 
ethical concerns and only include them where the sources allow such an approach.  
 
In the following, I seek to answer the following questions: 
i. How AWS should be defined and whether there are any legal restraints on the 
technology, hereunder the notion “meaningful human control.” 
ii. How IHRL may apply during an IAC. 
iii. Whether IHRL may apply extraterritorially through the use of AWS, with a special 
emphasis on the notion of personal jurisdiction. 
iv. How the right to life and the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment may 
limit the adversaries’ conduct during hostilities, with a special emphasis on the ECHR 
Article 2 and only reference to the ICCPR Article 6. 
v. Whether IHL deems AWS illegal per se. 
vi. Whether the use AWS may pose special challenges to the law of targeting, with a 
special emphasis on the obligation to take precautions in attacks and the fundamental 
principles of IHL. 
vii. How states ought to conduct weapon reviews in accordance with AP I Article 36 
                                                        
73 For instance, Heather M. Roff argues that fully AWS "undermines existing command and control structures, 
aliminating what little power humans have over the trajectory and consequences of war." See Roff, H. M. 
(2014), p. 212; Paul Scharre, Presentantion at the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, April 13, 2015, page 4. 
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2. Actuality and definition of autonomous weapon systems  
 
In recent years, states and international organizations like the UN74 and the ICRC have shown 
an increased interest in AWS, and various actors conduct extensive research on the issue. The 
subject is now heavily debated on the international arena. For instance, the UN has held 
expert meetings in both 2015 and 2016 concerning the legal and moral implications of 
autonomous weapon systems. During these conferences, experts have discussed issues 
relating to possible challenges under IHRL and IHL due to the increased use of autonomy in 
weapons. A special issue concerned how states should deal with the potential delegation of 
human control over the selection of targets and use of force to AWS.75  
 
As states are the main subjects of the international community, it is unavoidable that their 
point of view is the starting point for this debate. As there does not exist any authoritative 
source that defines AWS, I will rely on military manuals and directives in order to construe a 
definition of AWS.  
 
 
2.1. Historical background of autonomous weapon systems  
 
The development of robotics started with small steps, with Nikola Tesla’s demonstration of a 
remotely controlled motorboat in 1898 as an illustrious starting point.76 This also marked the 
beginning of the electrical age with crucial innovations like the radio, computer science and 
the Internet – all of them being important contributions to the evolution of modern 
technology.  
 
Robotic features in weapon systems have been in use since the First World War,77 with 
gradually expanding advancements as the years passed by. Thus, robotics has helped 
militaries in “identifying potential targets, tracking them, the timing of when to fire and 
                                                        
74 The UN CCW meetings of experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, April 2015 and 2016. 
75 ICRC.org, A licence to kill for autonomous weapons? April 17, 2015.  
76 Robert Finkelstein, Military Robotics: Malignant Machines or the Path to Peace, paper presented at the 
Military Robotics Conference, Institute for Defense and Government Advancement, Washington DC, 10-12 
April 2006, revised January 2010, page 16. See also Electrical Engineer, Tesla's Electrical Control of Moving 
Vessels or Vehicles from a Distance, 17 November 1898.  
77 Peter Scharre’s presentation at the CCW (2015), page 2. 
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maneuvering or homing them onto targets” for decades.78 For instance, Carl Norden’s 
bombsight was a significant resource for the US Navy during the Second World War. The 
bombsight consisted of an analog computer with a mechanism capable of – once activated by 
an operator – dropping bombs with quite precise calculations of when and where to hit.79 
Another example is the German precision-guided drone “Fritz X” which was maneuvered 
with a joystick and transmitter.80  
 
Later on, in the 1970s, the U.S. military began to use laser-guided bombs and cruise missiles 
– also referred to as “smart bombs,” which are similar to the current fire and forget missiles.  
Smart bombs were successors of Fritz X, constructed with more advanced features. Before 
dropping the bomb, the operator would mark the target with laser or data. Once dropped, the 
bomb would automatically stay on the marked target until it hit.81 
 
2.2. Actuality of the thesis 
 
Although previously used, robotics as a military industry did not prosper before the attacks on 
USA 11 September 2001.82 Non-lethal precursors to present AWS debuted by participating in 
the rescue missions on Ground Zero. While human rescuers could not access the ruins without 
risking life or limbs, the robot called PackBot was able to get around.83 Its abilities made a 
good first impression on the military, and soon PackBot served its duty in Iraq. Here, it 
proved to be a lifesaver in the search for and neutralizing of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) – roadside bombs used by insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq.84  
 
Remotely controlled UCAVs, from now on referred to as drones, has become a frequently 
used type of robotics after 2001. When the Bush Administration declared its “War on Terror”, 
President Bush promised that the campaign would “not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated”.85 Drones proved to be a useful mean to 
                                                        
78 Ibid.  
79 The National Aviation Hall of Fame, Honoring Aerospace Legends to Inspire Future Leaders: Carl Norden; 
Singer, page 50. 
80 Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, Bomb, Guided, Ruhrstahl Fritz X (X-I); Peter Singer, page 48. 
81 Singer (2009), page 57. 
82 Singer (2009), page 61. 
83 The New York Times, Agile in a Crisis, Robots show their Mettle, September 27, 2001; Singer, page 23. 
84 Singer (2009), page 19-22 
85 Text of George W. Bush’s speech, The Guardian, 21 September 2001. 
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achieve this goal, and, according to William Boothby, the lethal attack on Qaed Senyan al-
Harathi86 in Yemen in 2002 represents the beginning of “a modern era in unmanned attacks 
from the air”.87  
 
This new era has brought with it new issues related to legality and regulation of air and 
missile warfare. For instance, CIA carries out drone attacks against people it has put on a 
classified “kill list.”88 The secrecy surrounding these operations creates difficulties in relation 
to the examination and categorization of drone warfare. Thus, the US uses drones to fight 
terrorism due to a method called targeted killing. In an IAC, targeted killings are potentially 
ideal. On the contrary, in a situation where there is uncertainty in regard of the applicable law, 
such killings are problematic and possibly illegal use of force under international law.89  
 
Thus, the degree of autonomy in weapon systems and the different types of weapon systems 
increases. From being mainly airborne, there are now weapon systems with various degrees of 
autonomy suitable for both land and sea operations as well. Hence, some speak of a new 
military revolution, where the extensive use of unmanned drones is only the mere beginning. 
 
 
2.3. Defining autonomy  
 
Although a number of states possess and develop AWS,90 the US and the UK are the only 
states known to have openly sought to clarify their policies on AWS through military 
directives.91   
 
                                                        
86 Al-Harathi was believed to be a high-ranking al Qaeda member and participant in the 2000 bombing of an 
American destroyer, see Solis, G. (2010), The Law of Armed Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
page 539. 
87 Boothby, W. (2014). Conflict Law: The Influence of New Weapons Technology, Human Rights and Emerging 
Actors, page 100. 
88 Thomas Nagel, Really Good at Killing, London Review of Books (Vol. 38 No. 5, March 2016).  
89 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Article 2(4). 
90 Thurnher, J., Means and Methods of the Future: Autonomous Systems. Contribution in Ducheine, P.A.L., M. 
N. Schmitt and F. P.B. Osinga (2016), Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, p. 181. 
91 Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting (2014), page 2. 
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ICRC’s findings moreover comply with the US’ definition as stated in its Department of 
Defense Directive 3000.0992 (DOD). According to the DOD, an autonomous weapon system 
is:  
 
“a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous weapon 
systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operations of the weapon 
system, but can select and engage targets without further human input after activation”,93 
and that AWS “shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate 
levels of human judgment over the use of force.”94  
 
In its Joint Doctrine Note (JDN), the UK goes a lot further in explaining the special features 
making the system autonomous. It describes AWS as:  
 
“capable of understanding higher level intent and directions. From this understanding and 
perception of the environment, such a system is able to take appropriate action to bring about 
a desired state. It is capable of deciding a course of action, from a number of alternatives, 
without depending on human oversight and control, although these may still be present. 
Although the overall activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable, 
individual action may not be.”95 
 
I have chosen to rely on the DOD, as this approach seems to be that most relied upon by other 
international actors.96 Moreover, the UK approach requires a very high level of situational 
awareness, which in turn demands that the weapon system is equipped with a high level of 
artificial intelligence.97 As I will show below, such an approach fails to appreciate the 
different dimensions of autonomy which is characterizing for the DOD definition. Moreover, 
the actuality of this thesis requires an approach that takes account of existing weapon systems 
and allows some degree of flexibility as to the dimensions of autonomy.  
                                                        
92 Department of Defense Directive, Number 3000.09, November 21, 2012, which is establishing the US 
Department of Defense's policies on autonomy in weapon systems. 
93 DOD, page 13-14. 
94 DOD, page 2 paragraph 4a. 
95 Joint Doctrine Note 2/11, The UK Approach To Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Ministry of Defence, 30 March 
2011. 
96 Apart from the reference to the ICRC, see for instance Paul A.L. Duscheine, Michael N. Schmitt and Frans 
P.B. Osinga, Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare, (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), p. 180. 




2.4. Dimensions of autonomy  
 
The US largely shapes the prevailing discussion concerning definitional aspects of AWS. Paul 
Scharre is the name of the man who has both led the DOD working group, and elaborated on 
technical aspects in relation to AWS in various international forums.98 In addition, he works 
with the Project on Ethical Autonomy which has presented several papers concerning AWS.99  
 
In the following, I will use Scharre’s approach to the different levels of autonomy together 
with Human Rights Watch’ emphasis on the operator’s position in “the loop.”100 
 
2.4.1. The loop 
 
The first dimension refers to the position that the human has in “the loop”, otherwise 
explained as the relationship between the human and the unmanned vehicle.101 There are three 
categories, depending on whether the human is “in the loop”, “on the loop” or “out of the 
loop”.  
 
If the human is in the loop/semi-autonomous, the unmanned vehicle uses autonomy to engage 
individual targets or specific groups of targets that the human has chosen on forehand.102 
Semi-AWS are not identifiable with drones, as they are not directly controlled throughout the 
operation but rather act autonomously in accordance with the instructions from the 
operator.103 The DOD defines semi-autonomous weapon systems as “[a] weapon system that, 
once activated, is intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that 
have been selected by a human operator.”104 Examples of such weapons are guided munitions, 
                                                        
98 Scharre’s presentation CCW (2015) and contributed with the proceeding Technological developments: where 
do we stand? What might the future look like? at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law's, 37th Round 
Table on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law in Sanremo, 2014, see Greppi, E. (2015). Conduct of 
hostilities: the practice, the law and the future. Milano: F. Angeli, page 200. 
99 Scharre, P. and Horowitz, M. (2015), Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon Systems, Center for a New 
American Security.  
100 HRW, Losing Humanity, p. 2. 
101 Scharre, P. and Horowitz, M. (2015), p. 6. 
102 Scharre, P. and Horowitz, M. (2015), p. 8; HRW: Losing Humanity, page 2. 
103 Scharre, P. and Horowitz, M. (2015), p. 6. 
104 DOD, page 14 
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which are projectiles, bombs, missiles, torpedoes and other weapons that are capable of 
homing onto their targets after being fired, released or launched.105 
 
In the next category, a human on the loop supervises the weapon system. A human-supervised 
AWS has the ability to select targets and deliver force without human intervention, but its 
operator can terminate the engagement.106 Thus, the operator can intervene in case of system 
failure and prevent unintended damage. Today, this category is only used for defensive 
operations where the reaction time is too short for an operator to be in the loop.107 Thus, 
contrary to semi-AWS, it is the machine who takes the decision to engage the target and not 
the operator. 
 
If the human is out of the loop, the weapon is a so-called fully autonomous weapon system 
(FAWS) intended to select targets and deliver force without human intervention.108 What is 
decisive here is that the weapon system uses autonomy "to engage general classes of targets in 
a broad geographic area according to pre-programmed rules, and human controllers are not 
aware of the specific targets being engaged."109  
 
The international controversy points to a large extent at the development and potential use of 
FAWS. One fear is that – since there is no human in or on the loop – humans will lose control 
over the machines' decisions. Another question is, however, to what extent militaries are 
prepared to delegate their control over battlefield decisions to machines.110 I will not go into 
that issue in the following discussion. 
 
2.4.2. Complexity of the machine: is it automated, autonomous or intelligent? 
 
The second dimension refers to the complexity, or intelligence, of the weapon system. The 
point is that the critical functions within the weapon system must be classified as either 
automated or autonomous. Only in the latter case can the weapon be regarded as an AWS. 
                                                        
105 Scharre, P. and Horowitz, M. (2015), p. 8. 
106 Ibid.; HRW: Losing Humanity, page 2. 
107 Scharre, P. and Horowitz, M. (2015), p. 12. 
108 HRW: Losing Humanity, page 2. 
109 Scharre, P. and Horowitz, M. (2015), p. 13. 
110 Roff, H. M. (2014), p. 221. 
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However, according to Scharre and Horowitz, there are no clear boundaries between the 
existing degrees of complexity,111 but the answer to this depends on whom you ask.  
 
For instance, according to the UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, a weapon system 
is automatic when it “is programmed to logically follow a pre-defined set of rules in order to 
provide an outcome.”112 Furthermore, the UK Approach states that a system does not qualify 
as autonomous “as long as it can be shown that the system logically follows a set of rules or 
instructions and is not capable of human levels of situational understanding”.113 Another 
difference is that while all the steps during the automatic system’s operation is predictable, 
individual actions taken by the AWS are not.114  
 
In comparison to the DOD, the UK Approach reflects a rather limited definition of AWS.  
Whereas the UK demands high levels of perception and understanding, the US seems to 
acknowledge that a weapon system may be partly automated and partly autonomous; what is 
decisive in our context is whether the decision to target and engage lies with the human 
operator or with the machine.  
 
2.4.3. The tasks the weapon system performs 
 
The third – and allegedly most important – dimension is which tasks the AWS is performing. 
Scharre’s point is that “for each task, we can ask whether for that task the system is semi-
autonomous, supervised autonomous or fully autonomous.”115 It is necessary to notice that the 
system as a whole contains of components with various functions and capacities, whereas the 
relevant tasks are those of selecting and engaging specific targets.116 
 
Christoph Heyns and the ICRC have a similar approach. In a report, Heyns relies upon the 
DOD definition of AWS and states that "[t]he important element is that the robot has an 
autonomous "choice" regarding selection of a target and the use of lethal force."117 The ICRC 
                                                        
111 Scharre, P. and Horowitz, M. (2015), p. 6.  
112 JDN, paragraph 205. 
113 JDN. paragraph 206b.  
114 JDN paragraph 205. 
115 Paul Scharre, CCW Presentation (2015), page 1. 
116 Scharre, P. and Horowitz, M. (2015), page 8. 
117 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary of arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 
A/HRC/23/47, April 2013, page 8 paragraph 38 
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went a little further when describing this "choice", and stated that an AWS "can 
independently select and attack targets, i.e. with autonomy in the "critical functions" of 
acquiring, tracking, selecting and attacking targets."118  
 
According to Dahl, current weapon systems can in fact choose between objects due to image 
processing capabilities that enable them to compare, for instance, infrared images with images 
of the target that have been downloaded to the missiles library.119 However, they cannot 
discriminate in accordance with IHL, nor do they have battlefield awareness or reason in 
order to make proportionate decisions.120  
 
Thus, there is an on-going discussion as to whether such a capability makes a weapon system 
autonomous. Guiding missiles are one example, as some argue that they operate without 
supervision due to their capability to independently select and engage their targets once they 
are launched. For instance, the UK Brimstone missile is able to “distinguish amongst tanks 
and cars and buses without human assistance, and can hunt targets in a predesignated region 
without oversight.”121 However, as the operator identifies the target before launching the 
missile, the very decision of engagement does in fact lie with him/her. One may argue, then, 
that these missiles fall within the category of semi-autonomous weapon systems in the 
loop,122 rather than being human-supervised or fully autonomous, taking the decision to 
engage on their own. 
 
2.5. Autonomy in current weapon systems 
 
As mentioned in section 1.1, robotic features have been in use since the Second World War, 
and are essential for modern militaries. Current weapon systems have a human in or on the 
loop, and include functions with various degrees of autonomy or automation and rely on pre-
programming rather than artificial intelligence. FAWS do arguably not yet exist, although 
Scharre and Horowitz mention some examples of weapon systems with fully autonomous 
functions. In the following sections, I will briefly examine existing weapon systems with 
various degrees of autonomy. I have divided them into defensive and offensive weapon 
                                                        
118 Report of the ICRC Meeting (2014), page 1.  
119 Dahl, A. W., (2013), Attacks in Air and Missile Warfare, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, p. 255. 
120 Sharkey N. E., Drones proliferation and protection of civilians. In G.L. Beruto, ed. International 
Humanitarian Law and New Weapon Technologies. Milan: FrancoAngeli, p. 108. 
121 The New York Times, Fearing Bombs That Can Pick Whom To Kill, November 11, 2014 
122 Scharre, P. and Horowitz, M. (2015), page 8. 
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systems, meaning that each section might contain examples of aerial-, naval- and ground 
systems.  
 
2.5.1. Offensive weapon systems with autonomy 
 
Military aerial robotics currently in use are mainly drones like the US' MQ-I Predator and 
MQ-9 Reaper.123 These are used for both surveillance and armed engagement, which enables 
their operators – whom are in the loop – to identify, target and attack adversaries from a safe 
distance. Although controversial, the international community generally accepts that IHL does 
not prohibit the use of such weapon systems.124 A supporting factor in this regard is that 
UCAVs are included in the provision entitling military aircrafts "to engage in attacks" in the 
Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (HPCR Manual).125 
According to the Commentary on the HPCR Manual (HPCR Commentary), UCAVs can be 
both remotely piloted and act autonomously. Hence, the HCPR Manual also acknowledges 
the existence of AWS and that such weapons can "engage in attacks as long as they qualify as 
military aircraft." The HPCR Commentary requires, however, that the "sensors and computer 
programs must be able to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, as well 
as between civilians and combatants."126  
 
Although the UCAVs in use are currently remotely controlled, progressing technology 
enables them to perform increasingly autonomous functions. One example is the British BAE 
Systems' combat drone prototype Taranis, which is – under the control of a human operator – 
"capable of undertaking sustained surveillance, marking targets, gathering intelligence, 
deterring adversaries and carrying out strikes in hostile territory."127 However, BAE Systems 
has – in partnership with QinetiQ Unmanned Services128 – equipped Taranis with full 
autonomous elements as well. Although BAE Systems does not explain which elements are 
autonomous, QinetiQ writes on its homepage that "[it] is a leading team, in collaboration with 
BAE Systems […] to develop a world-leading decision support system that allows UAVs to 
                                                        
123 US Air Force, MQ-9 Reaper, Official United States Air Force Website (September 23, 2015). 
124 ICRC, The use of armed drones must comply with laws (interview with Peter Maurer, 10 May 2013), see link: 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm (last entered 12 
November 2015). 
125 HPCR Manual (2009), Section D Article 17(a). 
126 Commentary on the HPCR Manual (2010), section II 17(a)(3), page 100. 
127 BAESystems.com, Taranis.  
128 A company specialized in unmanned services, see www.qinetiq.com (last entered May 2, 2016). 
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conduct some routine tasks autonomously – allowing the pilot to focus on higher level 
mission priorities."129 Other, non-critical functions are performed by the Northrop Grumman's 
fighter-size drone X-47B; it is the first autonomous unmanned aircraft to carry out carrier-
based launches and landings, and conduct Autonomous Aerial Refueling of another 
unmanned aircraft.130 According to Human Rights Watch, the X-47B prototype does not carry 
weapons. It is, however, designed for eventual combat purposes.131 
 
Self-guided missiles132 are another example of weapon systems which have undergone 
significant technical advancement.133 With the Naval Strike Missile (NSM), Norway has 
developed what the Norwegian company Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace (KDA) calls "the 
only 5th generation134 long range precision strike missile in existence as per today".135 
According to the description of the NSM, the missile is equipped with "Autonomous Target 
Recognition," which "ensures that the correct target is detected, recognized and hit."136 The 
Joint Strike Missile (JSM) is developed on the basis of NSM, and is supposed to be integrated 
with the F-35 fighter jet.  
 
Loitering missiles are another type similar to the self-guided missiles. However, they differ in 
important aspects, as the former is able to loiter for long hours and cover a larger 
geographical area.137 This difference enabled the military to use loitering missiles in 
operations without a specific target or a specific target location.138 An example of a loitering 
munition is Israeli Aerospace Industries' Harpy, an AWS designed to detect, attack and 
destroy radar emitters. According to Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI), the Harpy is a "Fire 
and Forget" autonomous weapon that hits the emitters with high hit accuracy and is able to 
                                                        
129 Qinetiq.com, Autonomous aircraft systems programme completes key trial, December 13, 2012.  
130 Northropgrumman.com, X-47B makes Aviation History…Again!  
131 HRW: Losing Humanity, page 16. 
132 Missiles are "self-propelled unmanned weapons – launched from aircraft, warships or land-based launchers – 
that are either guided or ballistic", see HPCR Manual Section A Article 1(z). 
133 International Affairs 91:4, 2015: Michael Mayer, The new killer drones: understanding the strategic 
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page 772. 
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loiter for many hours.139 IAI has developed several loitering munitions, whereas Harpy is 
apparently the only one without a man in the loop.140 In fact, the Harpy is allegedly the only 
fully AWS in current use.141 
 
SWARM technology refers to a group of AWS in which each individual aircraft is able to 
coordinate its moves with the others in a fixed pattern. The US is in front in developing this 
type of weapon system through its LOCUST program.142 According to the US Navy, their 
new system is able to "launch swarming UAVs to autonomously overwhelm an adversary" 
and is able to utilize "information sharing between the UAVs, enabling autonomous 
collaborative behavior in either defensive or offensive missions."143 Although autonomous, 
the US Navy ensures that "there will always be a human monitoring the mission, able to step 
in and take control as desired."144  
 
2.5.2. Artificial deep-learning and ethical governing 
 
In order to be fully autonomous and act without any human interference, the machine would 
necessarily need some sort of intelligence.145 In machines, intelligence is artificial. According 
to Singer, artificial intelligence (AI) makes the machine able to perceive and make use of 
complex information in order to achieve a certain task that requires decision-making.146  
Today, scientists are “converging complex ‘high-level planning’ computer algorithms,” which 
enables “computerized systems to increasingly make independent decisions and perform 
independent actions.” One type of AI is self-educating, and goes by the term "deep-learning 
AI". Deep-learning AI software mimics the human brain147 by using layers in a neural 
network. These layers analyze data concerning a certain scenario by first breaking down the 
information into constituent parts. Then, the machine activates one layer at the time in order 
                                                        
139 Israeli Aerospace Industries, Harpy loitering Weapon, IAI's official webpage, last entered March 31, 2016. 
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to build up a final understanding.148 Each layer uses the earlier perception to interpret the 
scenario in question a bit further. In the end of the perception process, the neural network has 
gained understanding and a basis for its final decision. With the right algorithms, these neural 
networks can be trained and taught to recognize a subject or scenario. This feature is essential 
for the robot's ability to adapt to changes in their environment and perceive an impression of 
the reality it works in.149  
In order to make FAWS able to comply with legal standards, roboticist Ronald Arkin has 
designed a feature he calls an “ethical governor.”150 The ethical governor requires the weapon 
system to use binary yes-or-no answers to evaluate gathered intelligence and analyze whether 
IHL prohibits an attack under the current circumstances. Non-compliance will force the 
FAWS to abort the attack.151 Second, if the attack is a “yes”, the FAWS has to evaluate 
whether the attack will be proportionate or not. The calculation will use an algorithm that 
“combines statistical data with ‘incoming perceptual information’ to evaluate the proposed 
strike ‘in a utilitarian manner.”152 In order to fire, the FAWS has to conclude that the attack is 
both ethical and proportionate. 153 
 
2.5.3. Meaningful human control as a key requirement 
 
To the extent that AWS are not capable of complying with the relevant rules without human 
monitoring, lawful use of means and methods of warfare requires the conduct to be under 
human control. Since there are not many states that have made guidelines as to how to use 
AWS, the discussion is necessarily based on the fundamental principles and existing sources 
that support the one or the other view. Due to existing AWS’ limited situational awareness, 
compliance with IHL requires that a human operator has some sort of control over the 
targeting process. 154 One may argue on this ground that states are obliged to ensure that 
operators exercise meaningful human control over the AWS.  
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The US has taken such an approach. According to DOD, the US policy is that AWS “shall be 
designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human 
judgment over the use of force."155 The level of control must enable the commander or 
operator to make "informed and appropriate decisions in engaging targets."156 Second, the 
interface has to be readily understandable to trained operators.157 Finally, persons who 
authorize or direct the use of AWS and operate them in the field are obliged to do so "with 
appropriate care" and in accordance with IHL and the rules of engagement.158  
 
The determinative factor is whether the operator is able to consider consciously the potential 
target and, if the weapon is human supervised, whether or not to abort the mission due to 
insufficient background information and data.159 The interface is an important asset in this 
regard, and so is the training of the operator and the testing and design of the AWS.160 Thus, 
whether the use is compliant with the directive relies on the loop and the relationship between 
operator and machine. 
 
 
2.6. Preliminary conclusion 
 
States develop and use more sophisticated and autonomous weapon systems in a steadily 
growing pace. Current offensive AWS have a human in or on the loop, which seems to be a 
minimum demand as existing AWS will not be able to comply with IHL without meaningful 
human control. However, the on-going development of “ground-breaking” computer software 
and artificial intelligence “have lead some experts to conclude that it is technologically 
feasible today to design a fully autonomous weapon system.”161 Whether the scientific 
advancement should progress in such a manner is a core issue in the current international 
discussion: Some argue that weapons equipped with strong AI may lead to less destruction, 
and even aid people in the fight against terrorism.162 Others are scared that such weapon 
                                                        
155 DOD (2012), p. 2 para 4a. 
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systems will become unpredictable and uncontrollable in regard of which decisions it takes.163 
However, the usefulness of AI is evident in warfare, as it will enable machines to be less 
independent on human monitoring. This comes to show due to the plans of the US military164 
and the eagerness of other states165 to invest in both AWS and AI. 
 
One should have in mind that those who promote a ban seems to aim at FAWS, not AWS that 
are under meaningful human control. Such a control is currently a demand in order to use 
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3. The impact of human rights law when states use autonomous weapon 
systems in international armed conflicts  
 
In addition to IHL, which directly regulates the conduct of hostilities,166 IHRL deriving from 
treaties or customary law may have a direct or indirect limiting impact on military 
operations.167 Due to the nature of weapon systems – namely that they are designed to cause 
death or immense destruction – the rules that most likely will be applicable to states' use of 
AWS, are the above mentioned right to life168 and the prohibition against ill-treatment. 169 In 
comparison with many other human rights, these rules are in a special position:170 the right 
not to be ill-treated is considered jus cogens and is already covered by IHL provisions.171 
Furthermore, the right to life is in principle non-derogable, except from where a death results 
from a use of force which is lawful under IHL.172 The applicability of IHRL during IACs is, 
however, controversial.  
 
3.1. The standing of international human rights law in international armed 
conflicts  
 
Whereas IHRL and national law are the main bodies of law applicable during peacetime,173 
states are obliged to comply with relevant and applicable obligations under both IHRL and 
IHL during IACs.174 There are, however, neither an exact definition of human rights nor an 
international consensus as regards their role in international law.175 The High Commissioner 
for Human Rights in the United Nations describes human rights as  
 
“rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, 
national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other status […] International 
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human rights law obliges states to act in certain ways or to refrain from certain acts, in order 
to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups.”176  
 
Although such descriptions are only indicative, the significance of IHRL in the international 
order is nevertheless evident: There are now numerous human rights treaties – both global and 
regional177 – and some of the rules have achieved status as customary international law.178 
 
The cornerstone of modern IHRL was laid in 1948, when the UN General Assembly adopted 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the Declaration on Human Rights).179 Although 
this is only a political document without legally binding effect, it is considered to be "of great 
importance in stimulating and directing the international promotion of human rights.”180 For 
instance, in the preamble, the Declaration on Human Rights expresses the importance of 
human rights by stating that “the inherent dignity and […] the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.”181 Furthermore, the preamble holds that “Member States have pledged themselves to 
achieve […] the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” and stresses that “a common understanding of these rights and 
freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge.” According to the 
UN itself, the Declaration on Human Rights "is generally agreed to be the foundation of 
international human rights law."182 
 
Other prominent – and legally binding – human rights instruments reflect the above-
mentioned assertion. For instance, the parties to ECHR considered that "this Declaration aims 
at securing the universal and effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein 
declared.”183 Moreover, the ICCPR is founded upon ideals that are in accordance with the 
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Declaration on Human Rights. According to the preamble, the parties to the ICCPR 
recognizes that: 
 
“[T]he ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear 
and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil 
and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights.”184 
 
The application of IHRL is different under the "law enforcement" from the "armed conflict" 
paradigm. IHL and IHRL have different points of departure due to the situations they are 
specially designed to govern; as the nature of armed conflicts brings with it complex and 
uncertain situations where it is arguably impossible to apply the rigorous human rights regime 
similarly as in peacetime.185 Thus, although IHRL mitigate the potential harm done to 
individuals to some extent, effective warfare requires militaries to be allowed a wide “margin 
of discretion” in respect of their decisions and operations.186 If IHRL is implemented into the 
IHL regime to a larger extent than what is appropriate in the context of armed conflict, the 
consequence may be that IHL, and for that sake IHRL, lose impact on state conduct. 
 
3.1.1. The inter-relationship between international human rights and international 
humanitarian law  
 
In earlier years, human rights were considered immaterial in case of an armed conflict. This 
perception has changed as the international legal community gradually has accepted the 
applicability of human rights during an armed conflict.  
 
In the Nuclear Weapons case, the ICJ concluded that the ICCPR Article 6, which prohibit 
‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life “does not cease in times of war.”187 The ICJ rather concluded 
that whether a deprivation of life is ‘arbitrary’ or not in an armed conflict “falls to be 
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which 
is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities."188  
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The ICJ reaffirmed this contention in the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and furthermore stated that:  
 
“[S]ome rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be 
exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of 
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian 
law.” 189  
 
The ICJ followed its own precedence in the Armed Activities judgment concerning Uganda's 
armed activities on the territory of Congo, where it listed up the binding obligations between 
the parties without emphasizing one branch of law over the other.190 As Boothby put it: 
"[T]he ICJ appeared to characterize the two bodies of law as complementary in nature".191 
This interpretation corresponds with the standing of the HRC, who has confirmed that “both 
spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”192 
 
Application of the lex specialis principle implies that where IHRL and IHL norms conflict, 
one may choose to apply the norm which is especially designed to regulate the matter in 
question.193 Thus, the question is which legal norm that most precisely addresses the issue in 
each specific case.194 In order to identify the relevant lex specialis, one may take into account 
the rules which are “more straight to the point; regulate the issue more effectively; and are 
more capable to accommodate particular circumstances.”195 However, one may “seek to 
produce an outcome that harmonizes the two norms as far as possible" and thus avoid 
excluding the other norm in the interpretation process.196 
 
The inter-relationship between human rights and international humanitarian law develops 
continuously. According to VCLT article 31(3)(b), a treaty shall be interpreted with account 
                                                        
189 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 
2004, paragraph 106.   
190 Armed Activities case, para 217 and 219. 
191 Boothby (2014), p. 332. 
192 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (80), The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, § 11. 
193 General Comment No. 31 (80), § 11; Magne Frostad, The Responsibility of Sending States for Human Rights 
Violations during Peace Support Operations and the Issue of Detention, p.158. 
194 Ben-Naftali (2011), p. 214. 
195 Frostad, M., p.158. 
196 Boothby (2014), p. 327. 
32 
 
taken to "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." It is also a general principle of treaty 
interpretation that “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties” must be taken into account.197 Thus, the current inter-relationship affects the 
interpretation of both IHL and IHRL-treaties in armed conflict. 
 
The development of the inter-relationship is especially apparent in relation to the ECHR, 
where the ECtHR approaches the provisions dynamically and is obliged to include other 
sources of international law in its interpretation. According to Bankovic, the underlying 
principles "cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum,”198 although the Court “must 
remain mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human rights treaty.”199 
 
In Hassan, the ECtHR started its examination by listing the above-mentioned case law 
concerning the inter-relationship between IHL and IHRL.200 By following ICJ’s approach, the 
Court concluded that the safeguards under the Convention continued to apply, “albeit 
interpreted against the background of the provisions of [IHL].”201 
 
Subsequently, it concluded that: 
 
“[D]eprivation of liberty pursuant to powers under IHL must be lawful to preclude a violation 
of article 5 § 1. This means that the detention must comply with the rules of IHL, and, most 
importantly, that it should be in keeping with the fundamental purpose of Article 5 § 1, which 
is to protect the person from arbitrariness.”202 
 
Thus, although Hassan concerned a potential violation of ECHR Article 5, the dictum is 
arguably generally applicable in the sense that the act or omission attributable to a contracting 
state “should be in keeping with the fundamental purpose” of the human right in question. 
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The question concerning the right to life in armed conflict must be solved in accordance with 
the method used in the Nuclear Weapons case and the Hassan case. For instance, where a 
death has resulted from the use of an AWS, the first question is whether IHL or IHRL is lex 
specialis under the present circumstances. For instance, if the AWS kills a civilian and the 
killing is not linked to an IAC, the above-mentioned approach may result in IHRL being lex 
specialis. If, however, the AWS is programmed or operated by someone who has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the civilian in question is directly participating in the IAC, IHL will 
presumably be regarded as lex specialis. This may be an additional argument for the notion 
that AWS must have a human in or on the loop to whom the decision to attack or not to 




Several conditions must be fulfilled in order to establish that a human rights treaty applies on 
a specific matter. First, it has to fall within the protection of the particular right. Second, the 
state in question must have ratified the convention at the time of the violation of a right. 
Thirdly, the right must protect the victim of a violation and the act in question must be 
attributable to a state agent acting on behalf of the state in question, and not to, for instance, 
another state, the UN or NATO.203  
 
Finally, application of human rights requires that the event or action takes place “within the 
jurisdiction” of a state which is a party to the convention.204 In general, jurisdiction is a 
“necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or 
omissions imputable to it” that activates the human rights obligation in question.205 
 
Traditionally, jurisdiction implied that the action took place on the territory of the contracting 
state. However, the international courts have taken a dynamic approach when assessing 
actions performed by contracting parties in other states, and have expanded the scope of 
application of human rights so that they, in certain circumstances, cover acts on other 
territories than that of the contracting state itself. This development has the strongest impact 
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on the ECHR system, although the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction may arise under all 
treaties.206  
 
A common denominator in cases where human rights obligations have applied 
extraterritorially has been that agents representing the contracting state have had some kind of 
physical appearance, either through belligerent occupation or through direct physical control 
over the individual. Due to the technological development, states become gradually more able 
to conduct unmanned acts of warfare over large distances. The concern is that a legal vacuum 
may occur when states become increasingly capable of using lethal force or conduct ill-
treatment without such physical appearance.  As armed conflicts often occur outside the 
territory of the perpetrating state and it is likely that AWS will be deployed extraterritorially, 
a question is whether and to what extent human rights apply in such a scenario.  
 
3.1.2.1. Extraterritorial application of the ICCPR 
 
According to Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, the contracting parties undertake to respect and 
ensure the rights in the Covenant "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction."  
 
The language indicates that the provision must be understood as covering only individuals 
who are both present within the territory of a contracting party and subject to its 
jurisdiction.207 However, a second way of interpretation suggests that the protection offered 
by the ICCPR covers both individuals present within a state's territory and those outside that 
territory, but nevertheless subject to that state's jurisdiction.208 In Burgos Lopez v Uruguay, 
the HRC held that the ICCPR applied extraterritorially, as:  
 
"[I]t would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant 
as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another 
State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory."209  
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However, the ICJ has recognized that jurisdiction under the ICCPR, although primarily 
territorial, can “sometimes be exercised outside the national territory.”210 This is due to the 
ICCPR’s object and purpose, the constant practice of the Human Rights Committee and the 
travaux préparatoires.211 For instance, the HRC has held that Article 2(1) obliges state parties 
to respect and ensure the rights laid down in ICCPR to “those within the power or effective 
control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the 
circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained”. 212 Moreover, 
according to the preparatory papers, “a State should not be relieved of its obligations under 
the covenant to persons who remained within its jurisdiction merely because they were not 
within its territory.”213 Consequently, the ICJ concluded that the ICCPR was “applicable in 
respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.”214 
 
3.1.2.2. Extraterritorial application of the ECHR  
 
The ECtHR has developed certain requirements that must be met before the ECHR applies 
extraterritorially.215 In Al-Skeini and others v the UK the ECtHR scrutinized the matter. After 
recalling that "[a] State's jurisdictional competence under Article 1 is primarily territorial", the 
Court re-stated the extraterritoriality doctrine216 by admitting that, in exceptional 
circumstances and with reference to the particular facts in each case,217 "acts of the 
Contracting States performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an 
exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1."218  
 
Thus, the question is whether military operations conducted with an AWS may amount to an 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
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There are two exceptions to the principle of territorial jurisdiction.219 First, a state may 
become responsible for acts or omissions by its state agents that produce effects outside its 
own territory,220 especially where such agents exercise physical power or control over an 
individual.221 This notion will hereinafter be referred to as personal jurisdiction.222   
 
Secondly, a state can become responsible where, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful 
military action, it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory.223 The 
control must be a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, and either be exercised 
"directly, through the Contracting State's own armed forces or through a subordinate local 
administration."224 When determining whether a contracting state's control over an area 
amounts to "effective control", one must primarily take into consideration the strength of the 
state's military presence in the area.225 However, if the control qualifies and the controlling 
state uses AWS in military operations, the jurisdictional link arises because of the control 
over the area and not because of the use of AWS.  
 
Personal jurisdiction is of another character than the geographical jurisdiction, as it solely 
demands that a state agent controls the individual in question. In Al-Skeini, the ECtHR 
identified three different grounds from which personal jurisdiction may arise.  
 
First, "the acts of diplomatic and consular agents […] may amount to an exercise of 
jurisdiction when these agents exert control and authority over others".226 This ground is not 
of further interest in the present discussion. Moreover, armed forces may bring an individual 
within the jurisdiction of a state through the second and the third strands of personal 
jurisdiction. According to Al-Skeini, the ECtHR recognizes that extraterritorial jurisdiction 
may arise 
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"[…] when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that 
territory, it exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that 
Government. […] Thus, where, in accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, 
authorities of the Contracting State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory of 
another State, the Contracting State may be responsible for breaches of the Convention 
thereby incurred, as long as the acts in question are attributable to it rather than the territorial 
State."227  
 
This was, for instance, the case in Al-Skeini, which concerned the deaths of 6 Iraqi nationals 
who were in UK's custody during the occupation of Iraq in 2003. The UK, together with the 
US, exercised powers of government temporarily, especially that of providing security in Iraq, 
including the maintenance of civil law and order.228 The ECtHR thus concluded that the UK 
"exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security 
operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the [UK] for the 
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention."229 Thus, if AWS are used to exercise a public 
power, like, for instance, targeted killings, this may amount to an exercise of authority and 
control which establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
 
Finally, state agents operating outside their territory, when these agents use force to bring the 
individual under the control of their territorial state’s authorities, can bring an individual 
within a contracting state’s jurisdiction.230  
 
This was the case in Pad v Turkey. Here, the Court found that a bombing conducted from a 
helicopter was within Turkey's jurisdiction.231 Thus, the ECtHR departed from its earlier case 
law in Bankovic and others,232 from which it contended that "sole aerial bombardments 
carried out by a contracting state outside its territory are insufficient to bring affected persons 
within [the respective state’s] jurisdiction.”233 Furthermore, in Andreou v Turkey, the Court 
considered the shooting of a woman outside the area where Turkey exercised control as 
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within Turkey’s jurisdiction. This was due to the opening of fire from close range, "which had 
been a direct and immediate cause of her injuries."234 The cases are interesting as they show 
that a proven or admitted causality between the use of force and the potential violations of 
ECHR rights may provide the jurisdictional link that is needed in order to pin responsibility. 
 
In Al-Skeini, the ECtHR stated that jurisdiction does not solely arise from the control 
exercised by contracting states: what is decisive is the actual "exercise of physical power and 
control over the person in question".235 The technological development enables AWS to 
undertake tasks which usually were conducted by persons. Thus, with reference to Pad and 
Andreou, one may argue that the ECHR should apply extraterritorially where a programmer 
or an operator has directed a semi- or human-supervised AWS to attack a specific target. 
However, this question has not yet been settled authoritatively. 
 
 
3.2. Does the right to life limit the use of autonomous weapon systems in 
international armed conflicts?  
 
During an IAC, the protection of the right to life provided solely by IHRL is not attainable as 
IHL permits states to kill combatants in order to achieve their military objectives. Moreover, 
civilian casualties as a result of an attack are allowed to the extent that the number of deaths is 
not excessive.236 In the planning of and during military operations, the 'fog of war' is an 
accepted fact allowing a wider margin of error than would be the case in a law enforcement 
operation. However, IHRL has become, as shown above, a legal branch which militaries must 
take regard of during hostilities. The issue in the following is not whether IHRL applies, but 
to which extent it applies and how it harmonizes with IHL and thus provide additional 
regulations applicable to the use of AWS. 
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"Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. […]. 
 
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it 
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” 237 
 
The ECHR’s universal counterpart is the ICCPR Article 6(1), which holds that: 
 
“[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”238  
 
The test is whether a deprivation of life was 'arbitrary', which must be determined individually 
in each case239 based on the requirements of 'law'.  
 
3.2.1. The obligation to protect the right to life during international armed conflicts 
 
There are three dimensions of the right to life in both ECHR Article 2 and ICCPR Article 6. 
First, the provisions contain a negative obligation prohibiting the state from depriving a 
person from his or her life unless the ‘law’ and the circumstances allow for an exception. 
ECHR Article 2(2) justifies a death resulting from the use of force by a state agent must be in 
accordance with IHL or Article 2(2). Similarly, ICCPR Article 6 demands that states take 
measures “not only to prevent and punish deprivation by criminal acts, but also to prevent 
arbitrary killing by their own security forces.”240 This includes acts done during an IAC,241 
although with the reservation that the interpretation may have to take regard of IHL as lex 
specialis.  
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Second, the right to life in both provisions contain a positive obligation to protect individuals 
from unjustifiable deprivation of life. This means that the lives of the individuals within the 
contracting state's jurisdiction are protected through effective and practical laws.242 A crucial 
requirement in this regard is that the legal framework "must strictly control and limit the 
circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life".243 In addition, it has to be 
"formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct."244 In the 
context of IACs, the law must adequately regulate the conduct of hostilities – and presumably 
the use of AWS – through domestic martial law, rules of engagement and the general law of 
targeting. Thus, if the law of AWS is not within the IHL framework, this may constitute a 
violation of the right to life. 
 
In order to ensure compliance with these rules, Article 2 demands that states provide 
"appropriate training, instructions and briefing to its soldiers […] and exercise strict control" 
over, inter alia, military operations.245 This includes the regulation of the conduct […] of 
persons acting on behalf of the state's armed forces.246  Thus, if programmers or operators are 
not given proper training and instructions, this may be a breach of the right to life.  
 
Furthermore, ECHR Article 2(1) obliges states to ensure effective and practical protection and 
take "appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction."247 This means 
that the contracting states must "grant individuals the legal status, rights and privileges" that 
are needed in order to secure those within the ECHR's jurisdiction their rights in accordance 
with Article 1.248 Likewise, in ICCPR Article 6, the positive obligation to protect the right to 
life includes the duty to "take necessary steps […] to adopt such laws or other measures as 
may be necessary to give effect" to it.249 This should include admitting civilians their status as 
protected persons within the IHL framework and granting lawful combatants their privilege to 
be considered hors de combat when IHL so requires. Thus, the person or AWS that 
determines an engagement must be able to identify the legal status of the target.  
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In addition to ensure protection through preventive laws, contracting states to the ECHR have 
to put in place "an appropriate legal and administrative framework to deter the commission of 
offences against the person, backed up by law enforcement machinery for the prevention, 
suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions."250 The ICCPR has a similar 
obligation, as the contracting parties must ensure that the individuals have access to an 
effective remedy;251 that the person claiming remedy gets his right determined by a competent 
authority;252 and to ensure that granted remedies are enforced.253  
 
The last dimension of the right to life contain procedural demands in both the planning stage 
of an operation and in an investigative phase after an engagement with a lethal outcome.  
 
For instance, the ECtHR found a violation of the procedural dimension in the McCann case. 
Here, the UK claimed that the killing of three members of the Provisional IRA was justified. 
The victims were suspected terrorists, who the UK believed were about to carry out a 
bombing in Gibraltar. The Court examined whether the use of force was compatible with 
Article 2 by scrutinizing, inter alia, "whether the anti-terrorist operation was planned and 
controlled by the authorities so as to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to 
lethal force",254 and found that this was not the case.  
 
The ECtHR has clarified that the obligation to plan an operation also applies during military 
operations in armed conflicts. In Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva, the applicants were 
attacked during an evacuation.255 The attack resulted in the death of Isayeva's two children 
and the wounding of Yusupova and Bazayeva.256 The question before the Court was whether 
the Russian military had planned and conducted in such a way as to avoid or minimize, to the 
greatest extent possible, damage to civilians.257 The Russian government claimed that the 
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deaths "had resulted from the use of force absolutely necessary in the circumstances for 
protection of a person from unlawful violence."258 However, the Court concluded that Russia 
violated Article 2 because of inadequate planning and disproportionate use of force.259  
 
The obligation to plan operations is not without exceptions. As shown in the Finogenov case, 
the ECtHR may “occasionally depart from that rigorous standard of “absolute necessity,” as 
“its application may be simply impossible where certain aspects of the situation lie far beyond 
the Court’s expertise and where the authorities had to act under tremendous time pressure and 
where their control of the situation was minimal.”260 The case concerned a dramatic rescue 
mission where Chechen terrorists had taken 950 hostages whose lives were in serious risk. 
The ECtHR accepted that, “with regard to the military aspect of the storming, no specific 
preliminary measures could have been taken” and that ”the military preparations for the 
storming had to be taken very quickly and in full secrecy.”261 Thus, the Court accepts that 
states departure from their obligation to plan an operation in exceptional circumstances, and is 
“prepared to grant them a margin appreciation, at least so far as the military and technical 
aspects of the situation are concerned.”262 However, the Court might take a closer look at the 
subsequent phases of an operation where no serious time constraints exist and the authorities 
have control.263  
 
The Court’s remarks concerning the margin of appreciation in regard of military and technical 
aspects may become of importance in relation to operations involving AWS. For instance, 
states are likely to employ AWS in operations of self-defence, where these weapons provide 
speed and precision. If we picture that a defending autonomous missile neutralizes an 
incoming missile equipped with bacteriological, chemical or atomic weapons, the latter may 
affect the civilians inhabited in the area of interaction instead of the original target – a 
decision that is either in the hands of the AWS’ operator or of the AWS itself. If we follow 
this train of thought, the possibility to plan the interaction may become impossible, and 
consequently the obligation to plan and control the operation ceases to apply.  
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Finally, the state is obliged to carry out effective investigations in cases where an individual 
has lost his or her life because of lethal use of force by state agents. This obligation is 
required by implication from the obligation to protect the right to life read in conjunction with 
the state’s general duty to secure it.264 The essential purpose of such investigations is "to 
secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws […] and, in those cases involving 
State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their 
responsibility".265  
 
The ICCPR Article 6 also obliges states to conduct proper investigations in case of allegations 
of violations of the right to life. Such investigations must be carried out “promptly, 
thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies.”266 A failure to 
investigate can in itself constitute a breach of the Covenant.267 
 
3.2.2. Justifiable deprivation of life 
 
According to the ECHR Article 2(2), deprivation of life may be justified when the death 
results from a use of force that is “no more than absolutely necessary.” Thus, while the 
general proportionality test means that any state interference imposed on an ECHR right 
“must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued,”268 the notion “strictly proportionate” 
demands a higher threshold before the aims set out in Article 2(2)(a)-(c) can be justified.269 
Moreover, the Court conducts an objective assessment of whether the use of force is strictly 
proportionate.270  This is a crucial difference from the Court’s ruling in cases concerning 
interference in other ECHR rights, except from Article 3, where states are allowed a wider 
margin of appreciation than that.271  
                                                        
264 Esmukhambetov and Others v. Russia, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), App. No. 23445/03, 29 
March 2011, para 115. 
265 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia, para 208; Esmukhambetov and Others v. Russia, para 115. 
266 Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (2009), para. 866. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Handyside v UK, para 49. 
269 McCann v UK, para 149.  
270 Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick (2014), p. 227. 
271 Ibid. The classic formulation of the margin of appreciation doctrine derived from Handyside v UK, in which 
the Court stated: “By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, state 
authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the…”necessity” 
of a “restriction” or “penalty”…it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the 




Whereas the ECHR Article 2(2) contains justifications for a deprivation of life, the ICCPR 
Article 6(1) has no explicit exceptions. Rather, what is decisive is whether the act that causes 
a death is in accordance with the law. Thus, in order to provide an effective protection of the 
right to life, the law must "strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may 
be deprived of his life by the authorities of a State".272 Furthermore, the act in question must 
comply with the requirements of necessity, proportionality and precaution.273 
 
According to the ICCPR Article 4 and ECHR Article 15, many of the IHRL obligations are 
derogable. However, the right to life is, in principle, non-derogable. In this respect, the 
ICCPR and ECHR depart: whereas the right to life is without exceptions in ICCPR, ECHR 
Article 15(2) justifies deprivation of life is where it results from 'lawful acts of war'.274  
 
However, although contracting states have been militarily involved in a number of armed 
conflicts, no state has filed a formal derogation in respect of their activity.275 The need for 
such a formal derogation was addressed in Hassan v UK.276 The Court accepted "the lack of a 
formal derogation"277 with reference to the "consistent practice on the part of the High 
Contracting Parties."278 The state practice that the Court referred to – or, rather the lack of 
such practice – concerned the states’ understanding of the ECHR in comparison to the GCs. 
As pointed out by the ECtHR, the four Geneva Conventions “intended to mitigate the horrors 
of war” and “were drafted in parallel to the [ECHR].”279The Court concluded that derogation 
was not required during armed conflict, as long as the respondent state “specifically pleaded” 
– in its proceedings before the Court – that the article in question should be interpreted and 
applied in the light of the relevant provisions of IHL.  
                                                        
the contracting states a margin of appreciation. This margin is given both to the domestic legislator (“prescribed 
by law”) and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and apply the laws in force,” 
see Handyside v. UK, para 48-49. See also Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick (2014), p. 14-17. 
272Suarrez de Guerrero v Columbia, Communication No. 45/1979: Colombia, 31/03/82, CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979 
(Jurisprudence), 31 March 1982, para 13.1; John Khemraadi Baboeram, Andre Kamperveen, Cornelis Harold 
Riedewald, Gerald Leckie, Harry Sugrim Oemrawsingh, Somradj Robby Sohansingh, Lesley Paul Rahman and 
Edmund Alexander Hoost. v. Suriname, Communication No. 146/1983 and 148 to 154/1983, U.N. Doc. Supp. 
No. 40 (A/40/40) at 187 (1985), para. 14.3. 
273 Melzer (2008), p. 101. 
274 ECHR Article 15(2). 
275 The Hassan case, para 101; Harris, O'Boyle & Warbrick (2014), p. 830. 
276 The Hassan case, para 99. 
277 The Hassan case, para 103. 
278 The Hassan case, para 101.  




However, with reference to the lex specialis principle, the lawfulness of a lethal attack 
conducted by an AWS during an IAC must, in principle, be assessed with reference to IHL, 
hereunder the law of targeting.280 
 
 
3.3. Does the prohibition against torture or inhuman treatment limit the use of 
autonomous weapon systems in international armed conflicts?  
 
 
Both the ECHR and the ICCPR prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, commonly referred to as ill-treatment, inflicted by either physical or mental 
suffering.281 This is relevant in the present thesis because a consequence of drone warfare is 
that civilians living in areas under surveillance and attacks may suffer from mental stress 
directly caused by fear and anguish for sudden attacks, in addition to severe physical suffering 
after an attack. I regard the appearance of AWS as analogous to drones in this matter, as it is 
not likely that civilians on the ground notice whether the attacking weapon system is remotely 
controlled or autonomous. Thus, it is plausible that civilians will experience the same, or 
greater, suffering if drones are replaced with AWS.  
 
According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan Mendéz, “[a] deadly attack on 
illegitimate targets amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if […] it results in 
serious physical or mental pain and suffering for the innocent victims”.282 In addition to 
attacks, the sole presence of drones over an area may cause serious trauma to the civilian 
population living there. According to a case study made by Stanford Law School and NYU 
School of Law concerning the US drone warfare in Pakistan, “US drone strike policies cause 
considerable and under-accounted for harm to the daily lives of ordinary civilians, beyond 
death and physical injury.”283 The study underpins this position with reference to one of its 
findings, namely that:  
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“Drones hover twenty-four hours a day over communities in northwest Pakistan, striking 
homes, vehicles, and public spaces without warning. Their presence terrorizes men, women, 
and children, giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian 
communities.”284 
 
According to another study made by the human rights organization Reprieve, which also 
investigated the US drone program in Pakistan, drone attacks are not as precise as US official 
claims. The study holds that 1,147 people have been killed under drone attacks, although only 
41 people have been targeted.285 The pressure on the civilian population living under the 
drones have a significant impact on their way of living, which is, according to Reprieve’s 
director Clive Stafford Smith, “collapsing” as “kids are too terrified to go to school, adults are 
afraid to attend weddings, funerals, business meetings, or anything that involves gathering in 
groups. Yet there is no end in sight, and nowhere the ordinary men, women and children of 
North West Pakistan can go to feel safe."286 
 
In the following sections, I will limit my assessment to whether the use of AWS in IACs may 
violate the prohibition against torture or inhuman treatment under respectively the ECHR and 
the ICCPR. Thus, the prohibition against degrading treatment and inhuman or degrading 
punishment falls outside the scope of the present discussion. 
 
According ECHR Article 3, “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” Some have argued that the provision should be strictly interpreted 
and thus only cover the most serious forms of ill-treatment.287 However, with reference to the 
ECtHR’s case law, intermediate acts of ill-treatment also fall within the scope of Article 3.288  
The same prohibition is codified in the ICCPR Article 7, which states that “[n]o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.  
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The provisions are written in absolute terms. Thus, violations of the prohibition cannot be 
justified with reference to the public interest, and they are non-derogable in times of armed 
conflict.289 For instance, the ECtHR has concluded that “the undeniable difficulties inherent 
in the fight against crime, particularly with regard to terrorism, cannot result in limits being 
placed on the protection to be afforded in respect of the physical integrity of individuals.”290 
Similarly, although most of the case law regards suffering from physical assaults, the  
"infliction of mental suffering by creating a state of anguish and stress by means other than 
bodily assault" may qualify as "non-physical torture".291 Likewise, with reference to the legal 
standing under the ICCPR, the HRC has stated that “no justification or extenuating 
circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation of article 7 for any reason”.292 
 
Although the cited decision concerned the fight against crime, the non-derogable nature of the 
provision implies that states are obliged to respect the physical integrity of individuals also 
during IACs. The ECtHR’s notion “respect of” should nevertheless be interpreted in the light 
of the prevailing circumstances; namely that the nature of an IAC may result in lawful 
inflictions on the physical integrity of individuals which would not be lawful in peacetime. 
 
In Kudla v Poland, the ECtHR stated that ill-treatment has to “attain a minimum level of 
severity” in order fall within the ECHR Article 3.293 The level of severity “depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and 
method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects, and, in some cases, the 
sex, age and state of health of the victim”.294 Likewise, the terms in the ICCPR Article 7 lack 
a statutory definition and the prohibited acts must be identified with reference to the “nature, 
purpose and severity” applied.295 In the present context, the method of execution and the 
mental effects are, as I will show below, of special importance. 
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According to the case law from the ECtHR, the categorization of the ill-treatment depends on 
a mental element which must be present at the time of the violation. For instance, in order for 
an act to qualify as torture under the ECHR, it must be a “deliberate inhuman treatment 
causing very serious and cruel suffering”.296 The suffering must have been inflicted 
intentionally and there must have been a specific aim underlying the ill-treatment.297  
 
With reference to AWS, it is not likely that the machine itself will act with the required intent 
and purpose so that the act amounts to torture under the ECHR. In order to invoke that there 
has been a violation of the prohibition against torture, the programmmer or operator would, 
with intention, have to inflict a qualified form of suffering by the use of an AWS. In similarity 
with other means and methods of warfare, the use of AWS may amount to torture if the 
programmer or operator deliberately and with a specific purpose inflicts very serious and 
cruel suffering. 
 
In contrast to torture, an instance of inhuman treatment needs neither to be inflicted with 
intention nor with a specific purpose.298 What is required as a minimum is that the ill-
treatment causes a qualified form of "either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental 
suffering."299 In the following, I will focus on whether the use of AWS in itself may inflict 
suffering which is severe enough to amount to ill-treatment.  
 
In Esmukhambetov and Others v Russia, the ECtHR examined whether the indiscriminate 
bombing of a village resulting in the deaths of 5 civilians amounted to ill-treatment under 
ECHR Article 3. The applicants complained that they had suffered “severe mental distress 
and anguish in connection with the attack on their village, the deaths of their close relatives 
and the destruction of their houses and other property.”300 The Court found that Article 3 did 
not apply to the incidents where the applicant in question had solely witnessed the destruction 
of his home or found his relatives dead. The contrary was the case in regard of the applicant 
named Esmukhambetov, who witnessed the killing of his whole family and consequently 
“experienced a shock of such intensity that he suffered from a temporarily loss of 
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memory”.301 Thus, the Court considered that the suffering he endured was of such severity 
that it amounted to inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3.302  
 
The above-mentioned studies show that individuals have been targeted without precaution in 
drone attacks, and that these attacks can result in severely traumatized eyewitnesses. Thus, 
given that the engagement falls within the attacking state’s jurisdiction, similar attacks 























                                                        




4. How international humanitarian law regulate the use of autonomous 
weapon systems in international armed conflicts 
 
IHL governs the conduct of hostilities during IACs. As the term ‘humanitarian law’ suggests, 
humanitarian considerations are one of the driving forces behind modern IHL.303 The other is 
basically the nature of armed conflict, which demands that the adversaries are allowed to use 
violent measures necessary to defeat their enemies.304 Hence, IHL provides a legal order 
seeking to establish a balance between the unavoidable brutality of war and considerations of 
humanity.305   
 
Application of IHL requires that the conflict in question amount to an IAC.306 As no 
multilateral treaty defines "armed conflict," state practice and the subsidiary sources provide 
the arguments.307 According to GC I/II/III/IV Common Article 2, the conventions "apply to 
all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more 
of the High Contracting Parties."308 A preliminary question is thus at what point the conflict 
reaches the required threshold. 
 
4.1. When does the conflict amount to an international armed conflict? 
 
Two theories are prevailing: the "first-shot"309 theory and the theory that some incidents – 
involving the use of force – are simply hostilities "short of war."310 There are a number of 
issues where the answer depends on the choice of theory. For instance, questions concerning 
the treatment of the wounded or captured members of the armed forces depend on the 
prevailing legal regime. Moreover, IHRL receives a different content once an armed conflict 
has broken out.  
                                                        
303 Dinstein, Y. (2010), page 4; Solis, G.D. (2010), page 7. 
304 Dinstein,Y. (2010), page 4 
305 Fleck (2013), p. 36. 
306 Dinstein, Y. (5th edition, 2011). War, Aggression and Self-Defence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 9. 
307 International Law Association Committee on the Use of Force, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed 
Conflict in International Law (2010) (74 Int'l L. Ass'n Rep. Conf. 676 2010), page 681. 
308 GCs Common Article 2 first paragraph; see also The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995, paragraph 70. Declarations of war are rather the exception than the rule 
today, and I will not examine this condition. 
309 Meaning that IHL applies once a State uses armed force against another, see Fleck (2014), page 44-45. 
310 Hostilities not reaching the armed conflict threshold, like for instance border clashes or single incidents of 
armed force, see Dinstein, Y. (2011), page 11 and Fleck (2014), page 45. 
51 
 
The Commentary on GC I holds that "[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading 
to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even 
if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the 
conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place."311 Furthermore, it contends that "[i]f there 
is only a single wounded person as a result of the conflict, the Convention will have been 
applied as soon as he has been collected and tended […] and his identity notified to the Power 
on which he depends."312 The latter statement may reflects the "first shot"-theory – a position 
that is perhaps not surprising as the ICRC's objective is clearly to ensure humane treatment of 
persons involved in hostilities.313 
 
On the other hand, the "short of war" theory provides a more flexible approach where states 
are not as quickly allowed the ‘privilege to kill’ which IHL brings about. The International 
Law Association Committee on the Use of Force describes such incidents as follows: 
 
"[A] distinction is made between the violence that gives rise to the right of a state to claim the 
belligerent's privileges to kill without warning, detain without trial, or seize cargo on the high 
seas. The violence must be organized and intense – even between sovereign states – before the 
otherwise prevailing peacetime rules are suspended. States, international organizations, courts 
and other legitimate actors in the international legal system distinguish lower level or chaotic 
violence from armed conflict."314  
 
Dinstein – who favors this theory315 – mentions a number of typical incidents short of war: 
Border patrols of neighboring countries which exchange fire, naval units which torpedo 
vessels flying another flag and interceptor planes which shoot down aircraft belonging to 
another state.316 According to this approach, it is likely that single instances of targeted 
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killings conducted by AWS (or drones) will be described as a lower level of violence and thus 
not fall within the IHL regime. 
 
According to Fleck, the acceptance of incidents "short of war" – without regarding them as 
IACs – "bears the risk of creating an international legal vacuum or of depriving certain 
categories of persons the protections that [IHL] provides."317 His suggestion is to adhere to 
the "first shot" theory in such a way that where a minor incident between states occurs, the 
factual circumstances determines which part of IHL that applies. Consequently, the reason for 
the inapplicability of IHL must be "purely factual rather than legal."318 Thus, the "first shot"-
theory seems to require objective evidence: Once the conditions are fulfilled, IHL applies to 
the specific circumstances in question. 
 
However, in reality, the legal effect of an incident depends on the later action of the states 
involved. In Dinstein's words, "[a]s long as both Parties choose to consider what has 
transpired as a mere incident, and provided that the incident is rapidly closed, it is hard to 
gainsay that [they have engaged in an IAC]."319 An example of such an incident short of war 
is the downing of a Russian warplane by Turkey on the Syrian border in 2015. Although the 
downing was condemned, it did not result in an armed conflict between Turkey and Russia.320  
 
4.2. The balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations  
 
Once a violent situation qualifies as an armed conflict and IHL becomes the prevailing body 
of law, the principle of military necessity justifies that the belligerents apply "any amount and 
kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible 
expenditure of time, life and money".321 Thus, in principle, states are free to use AWS in the 
manner they prefer. However, any destructive action taken by an armed force against an 
adversary must be necessary from a military perspective. In the words of the American 
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Military Tribunal in the Hostage case: "[D]estruction as an end in itself is a violation of 
international law."322  
 
The principle of military necessity is well established in IHL.323 Although neither the GCs nor 
AP I provide a statutory definition of the term,324 one can derive its content from various 
provisions and customary law.325 According to AP I Article 52(2), belligerents are only 
permitted to attack those objects "whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, 
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage." The notion 
"definite military advantage" means that the adversaries are not entitled to carry out attacks 
"which only offers potential or indeterminate advantages."326 Thus, the notion of “military 
advantage” provides a counterweight to the notion of military necessity, as it is not sufficient 
that an adversary deems an action necessary "to compel the complete submission of the 
enemy" in order to render an attack lawful.  
 
In order to comply with IHL and take proper account of the balance between military 
necessity and humanitarian considerations, the person who is planning or performing a 
military operation is obliged to take precautionary measures in attacks.327 This means that he 
or she has to consider how to comply with these principles and other applicable rules in the 
planning of and during an attack in order to minimize the effects on civilians and civilian 
objects when conducting military operations328 – an exercise which may be challenging when 
the decision of engagement is taken by the AWS.  
 
In addition to the mere regulation of the conduct between the adversaries, IHL includes rules 
concerning the legality of weapons. As any use of an illegal weapon would be contrary to 
IHL, the first main question is whether AWS are illegal per se. 
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4.3. The legality of autonomous weapon system under international 
humanitarian law 
 
Legal restrictions concerning the legality of weapons are essential to ensure that the above-
mentioned balance between humanitarian and military considerations329 is effective and 
enforceable. Thus, IHL is based on the premise that "[i]n any armed conflict, the right of the 
Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited."330 If states 
were free to possess – and presumably use – any weapon, this could lead to a dilution of the 
whole IHL. Consequently, weapons are inherently unlawful if states are unable to comply 
with relevant rules of IHL due to the expected use of the weapon in question. 
 
The ICJ affirmed this contention in the Nuclear Weapons case, where it stated that: 
 
"[H]umanitarian law, at a very early stage, prohibited certain types of weapons either because 
of their indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians or because of the unnecessary 
suffering caused to combatants, that is to say, a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve 
legitimate military objectives."331  
 
Thus, weapons must be able to comply with two "cardinal principles" in order to be lawful: 
the prohibition against indiscriminate effects332 and the principle prohibiting unnecessary 
suffering.333  
 
It follows from the prohibition against indiscriminate effects that IHL does not allow states to 
use weapons which does not enable those who plan or conduct a military operation to 
distinguish civilians or civilian objects from military objectives. This is one aspect of the 
principle of distinction. 334 Similarly, an attack is indiscriminate if “the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required by the Protocol, and consequently, in each such case, are of a 
nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction."335  
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Types of indiscriminate attacks are, for instance, “an attack by bombardment by any methods 
or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct 
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing similar 
concentration of civilians or civilian objects.”336 Chemical337 and bacteriological338 weapons 
are two examples of means of warfare that create indiscriminate effects and consequently 
violate the principle of distinction.  
 
However, as Thurnher points out, the prohibition "focuses solely on the weapon's effects 
rather than its delivery method. The fact that a targeting decision might be made 
autonomously by the weapon system does not factor into the analysis."339 I will not go further 
into this topic. 
 
According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to 
combatants. This prohibition is a recodification and juxtaposition of HC II (1899) Article 
23(e) and HC IV (1907) Article 23(e). It is currently codified in AP I Article 35(2), which 
states that “weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”340 Moreover, it constitutes the red thread in the 
CCW.341 Although the relevant provisions are quite similar, the conditions are not identical. 
While the HC IV (1907) prohibits weapons that are calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, 
AP I has lowered the threshold and introduced an objective standard: A weapon is illegal if it 
is of a nature to cause unnecessary harm. According to the Commentary on the Aps, the 
wording was changed because the condition “calculated to cause” was considered 
inappropriate.342 Thus, what is decisive according to AP I, is the “objective character” of the 
weapon rather than the intentions of those in charge of its use.343  
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However, if states were to take AP I Article 35(2) by its wording, they would have to carry 
out an extensive and broad examination of all possible ways of use and misuse of an AWS. 
According to Clapham and Gaeta, the practice of states seems to be to examine the weapons 
“in relation to their designed or intended use”.344 On this basis, the same authors suggest, as a 
principle of international weapons law, that “the inherent lawfulness of a weapon is related to 
its designed purpose or expected normal use and not its potential to cause either superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering, or indiscriminate effect if used inappropriately.”345 Several 
authors seem to agree on the latter point of view.346 According to Article 36, which I will 
examine below, states are required to determine the lawfulness of a weapon in respect of its 
designed use.347 The need for coherency between these provisions is an argument in favor of 
such an interpretation.  
 
Although the terms “superfluous injury” and “unnecessary suffering” are not controversial, 
they lack authoritative definitions and are consequently left to interpretation.348 States did not 
manage to agree on the significance and scope of the principle “as far as actual means used in 
combat are concerned.” 349 Due to this definitional issue, the “concept of superfluous injury 
and unnecessary suffering, its objective effect on the victim (severity of the injury, intensity 
of the suffering), and its relation to military necessity (rendering the enemy hors de combat) 
are not interpreted in a consistent and generally accepted manned.”350 However, according to 
the above-mentioned passage from the Nuclear Weapons case, “unnecessary suffering” must 
be regarded as “a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military 
objectives." Thus, IHL requires a balancing test between the suffering, injury and military 
necessity. If the harm is not necessary in order to attain a military advantage, it is prohibited 
to use weapons which do not provide an alternative way to reach the objective. 
 
The threshold is nevertheless very high, and there are not many weapons deemed to be illegal 
in themselves. This is perhaps an expected result, as the potential effects and suffering relies 
on the context surrounding the specific use of the weapon in question. If a state uses an 
indiscriminate weapon on the open sea where there are no civilians, the distinction principle 
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does not activate. The same would apply to a scenario where a weapon potentially of a nature 
to cause superfluous suffering is employed against another machine. In other words, the 
activation of the principles is highly reliant on the context in which the weapons are used.  
 
With reference to the steady advancement of technology, states seem eager to discuss whether 
increasingly autonomy in weapons should have an impact on their legality. For instance, 
states have agreed to additional protocols to the CCW and other conventions concerning a 
variety of weapons.351 As already mentioned, the CCW Expert meetings have brought AWS 
into the international public eye.  
 
4.3.1. Analogous interpretation of the CCW Protocol II 
 
The United Nations has played an important role in the development of international weapons 
law through the CCW, including its protocols,352 which are based on the principles that the 
right to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited and on the prohibition of 
weapons that cause unnecessary suffering and superfluous injuries.353  
 
There are several protocols under the CCW,354 whereas Protocol II concerning mines, booby 
traps and other devices is of special interest in the present context. Protocol II relates to "the 
use on land of the mines, booby-traps and other devices […] including mines laid to interdict 
beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings".355 It prohibits the contracting states to use 
these weapons in breach with the distinction principle and the prohibition against their 
indiscriminate use.356  
 
One type of mines may be analogous to AWS. These are "remotely delivered mines," which 
the CCW Protocol II define as mines which are "delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or 
similar means or dropped from an aircraft."357 Some argue that the location of remotely 
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delivered mines “can only be estimated and they pose a special menace to civilians.”358 This 
may be similar to a case where the AWS lacks meaningful human control and oversight, and 
are thus moving freely within an area.359 
 
Protocol II seeks to redress such a feature by demanding that, if these mines are anti-
personnel, they must be equipped with “an effective self-destruction or self-neutralization 
mechanism and have a back-up self-deactivation feature". This mechanism must be "designed 
so that the mine will no longer function as a mine when [it] no longer serves the military 
purpose for which it was placed in position.”360 One argument against AWS – mainly FAWS 
– is the fear that states can lose control over the use of lethal force. Thus, if, for instance, an 
AWS like Israel’s Harpy is advanced to become anti-personnel, one may argue that it should 
be equipped with a self-destruction mechanism in order to be lawful means of warfare.  
 
4.3.2. The impact of the Martens Clause on international weapons law 
 
As mentioned in section 1.1, the Martens Clause has played an important role in international 
weapons law. Due to the reiteration of the Clause in various treaties and its standing as a 
customary norm, it reminds the international actors about their obligation to emphasize 
humanitarian considerations as well as military necessity when they develop and employ 
weapons. One might say that the prohibitions against indiscriminate weapons and 
unnecessary suffering are sufficient in this respect. However, the Clause may open up for 
additional humane considerations. For instance, as shown above in section 3.3, the AWS may 
be used in a way which violates the prohibition against inhumane or degrading treatment. As 
humane treatment of persons is required under IHL,361 a reference to the Clause may 
strengthen an argument in favor of a ban or strict regulation of AWS. 
 
4.3.3. Preliminary conclusion 
 
Current AWS do not fall within a customary founded prohibition. Moreover, it is not likely 
that states will ban AWS altogether. However, there may be a consensus in regard of the 
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limited employment of AWS with meaningful human control. In any matter, states must act in 
compliance with IHL, and may not use weapons that do not meet the requirements – 
including FAWS in so far the technology is not sufficiently advanced. The next question is 
thus how IHL, with reference to the law of targeting, regulate the use of them during military 
operations.  
 
4.4. How the law of targeting applies on military operations conducted with 
autonomous weapon systems  
 
The law of targeting seek to achieve the above-mentioned balance between the need to 
achieve a military goal and the need for humanitarian protection through rules deriving from 
the fundamental principles of military necessity, distinction, proportionality, humanity and 
precautions in attacks. In the law of targeting, the principle of precautions in attacks is of 
special relevance, as it obliges those who are in charge of a military operation to plan and 
conduct the engagement in compliance with the other principles.  
 
4.4.1. Compliance with the obligation to take precautions in attacks when an attack 
is conducted with autonomous weapon systems 
 
The obligation to take precautions in attacks is a fundamental principle of IHL, which is 
codified in AP I Article 57(1). This provision holds that the adversaries must take "constant 
care […] to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects" when they conduct 
attacks,362 and addresses the chain of command by obliging "those who plan or decide upon 
an attack" to “do everything feasible” to comply with the distinction principle.363 Moreover, 
they ought to “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack” in 
order to avoid or minimize incidental loss of or injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects364 and to refrain from deciding to launch disproportionate attacks.365  
 
The term "feasible" is not defined in the provision. According to CCW Protocol II, feasible 
precautions are "those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into 
account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military 
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considerations."366 This description is similar to uncontested submissions from several states 
upon the ratification of AP I, 367 and is presumably in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
of Article 57.  
 
What is "practically possible" largely depends on the technical means of detection available to 
the belligerents.368 Thus, when a state possesses equipment like surveillance UCAVs, the term 
"feasible" may suggest that the state is obliged to gather information about potential military 
objectives through aerial reconnaissance and intelligence. However, the military advantage 
plays a role in the assessment of what is “practically possible”.369 For instance, if the decision 
to attack must be taken fast and the potential target has a big military value, this may allow 
for an increased margin of error.370 Moreover, if the decision to attack is taken by a combatant 
not sufficiently high in rank to obtain accurate information about a target, this may lower the 
obligation to take precautions if he or she engages a target of opportunity.371  
 
In order to comply with Article 57, those in charge must evaluate the information due to "a 
serious check of its accuracy" once it is obtained.372 In case of doubt, the presumption is that 
the target is of civilian character.373 Thus, if there is reason to doubt the legal status of the 
objective to be attacked, those in charge “must call for additional information and if need be 
give orders for further reconnaissance”. One may argue that the use of AWS in military 
operations should strengthen the rule of benefit of the doubt; when the armed forces do not 
risk their own combatants' lives, they should perhaps be more cautious when they choose 
target and ensure that it is a military objective.  
 
If it becomes “apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special 
protection” or if the harm can be expected to be disproportional in relation to the anticipated 
military advantage, the attack must be cancelled or suspended.374 In any case, the final 
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decision must be taken in good faith and be based on common sense with an aim to identify 
the target and its surroundings in order to spare the civilian population and civilian objects as 
far as possible in compliance with the principle of distinction.375 
 
4.4.1.1. Compliance with the principle of distinction when an attack is conducted with 
autonomous weapon systems 
 
According to AP I Article 48, states are only permitted to "direct their operations […] against 
military objectives."376 Coherently, AP I Article 51(4) prohibits attacks “not directed at any 
specific military objective.”377 These provisions show different aspects of the principle of 
distinction, whose purpose is to protect civilians and civilian objects from the effects of an 
armed conflict. With reference to the protection provided by the principle, it is described as 
perhaps the most fundamental pillar of IHL378 and "the most significant battlefield concept a 
combatant must observe." 379  
 
An adversary using an AWS to carry out an attack must ensure that it is programmed in such 
a way that it is capable to identify a military objective, and thus limit its targeting to military 
objects and combatants.  
 
4.4.1.1.1. Identification of military objects 
 
The point of departure is AP I Article 51(2), which states that “the civilian population as such, 
as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”380 In order for a target to 
qualify as a lawful target, it has to be the counterpart to civilians and civilian objects – namely 
a “military objective.” This rule has status as customary law and is reiterated in several 
treaties.381 While the members of the armed forces are clearly within the targetable ambit, AP 
I Article 52(2) states that military objectives in the shape of objects are those which:  
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“by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage.”382 
 
Thus, there are two cumulative criteria that must be fulfilled for a target to be lawful: the 
target must make an effective contribution to the military action due to its nature, location, 
purpose or use, and the attack must result in a definite military advantage.383 The provision is, 
however, ambiguous and abstract, and much is left to the specific interpreter – and thus 
human subjectivity.  
 
Compliance with the principle of distinction requires situational awareness and continuous 
evaluation as military objects can have a dynamic nature: An object may be civilian, like for 
instance a church or a hospital. Yet, once the civilian object is used by the adverse armed 
forces in a way which violates its protection, it may become a legitimate military object.384 
 
Hence, in order to comply with the distinction principle, the programmer, operator, or, if ever 
possible, the AWS who is deciding to attack must be able to identify the object with reference 
to both “nature, location, purpose or use”. Furthermore, there must be room to assess whether 
to cancel or suspend the attack in accordance with AP I Article 57(2)(b), unless the situation 
makes such an assessment impossible. 
 
4.4.1.1.2. Identification of lawful combatants 
 
A state is entitled to attack combatants. However, only lawful combatants are entitled to 
participate in armed conflicts and enjoy the protection offered them by IHL.385 In order to be 
a lawful combatant, the key requirement is that the individual is a de facto member of the 
armed forces.386 On the contrary, unprivileged combatants are those who take direct part in 
hostilities although they are not members of the armed forces.387  
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The Annex of HC IV was the first treaty to address the matter, followed by the GCs and AP I. 
According to HC IV Article 1, the laws, rights and duties of war apply to armies that are 
obliged to and fulfill the following conditions: 
 
1) “To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2) To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3) To carry arms openly; and 
4) To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.” 
 
GC I/II/III and AP I reiterate these conditions in their common description of persons 
privileged with prisoners of war-status.388 Moreover, GC III Article 4 implies three additional 
conditions so there are seven conditions altogether:389  
 
5) Organization, meaning that lawful combatants must act within a hierarchical 
framework subject to supervision;390 
6) Belonging to a belligerent party, meaning that any irregular unit acting on behalf of a 
state party to the conflict must be under control by this state party, and there must be 
“a relationship of dependence and allegiance of these irregulars vis-à-vis that Party to 
the conflict;”391 and 
7) Lack of duty of allegiance to the detaining power, meaning that the combatant must 
not act against his or her own nation. For instance, if a Norwegian soldier fights 
against the Norwegian army in, let us say, Iraq, he or she will not be a lawful 
combatant entitled to PoW-status.392 
 
States have accepted the definition of combatants as stated in these two treaties, and it is 
assumed that they have acquired status as customary international law.393 
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AP I is, however, controversial as it widens the scope of persons who are entitled to PoW-
privileges.394 AP Article 44(3) stresses the well-established principle that “in order to promote 
the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged 
to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or 
in a military operation preparatory to an attack.” However, it goes on to recognize that “there 
are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed 
combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided 
that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly.” As Article 44(3) has met resistance from 
states as it arguably dilutes the principle of distinction, it is not recognized as customary law 
and thus only binding for states contracting to AP I. However, the contracting states are 
bound to this approach, and their AWS must be able to assess these additional criteria in a 
military operation, either through programming, human control or artificial intelligence. 
 
The importance of an obligation that demands objectively visible distinction between 
combatants and civilians is perhaps stronger than ever now that asymmetric warfare has 
become normality. This is especially important as the attacking state is only obliged to use 
“reasonable judgment in the circumstances” when the operator or/and the AWS proceed in 
order to carry out an attack and thus needs to apply the distinction principle.395 If it is not easy 
to distinguish civilians from combatants, the threshold may lower before it is reasonable to 
engage in an attack.  
 
4.4.1.1.3. The issue concerning civilians directly participating in hostilities  
 
According to AP I Article 51(3), which is recognized as customary law,396 civilians are 
afforded the protection provided by IHL "unless and for such time as they take direct part in 
hostilities"397 (from now on referred to as the DPH-rule). The rule implies that civilians must 
refrain from taking part in hostilities in order to enjoy the protection provided by IHL. On the 
contrary, IHL allows an adversary to target civilians that are DPH in addition to regular 
combatants.  
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The term "direct participation in hostilities" is generally understood as "acts of war which by 
their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the 
enemy armed forces."398 However, international actors disagree about the scope of the terms 
"direct participation" and "for such time", and consequently how the norm should be 
applied.399 
 
A point of departure is, however, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of DPH 
under IHL.400According to the ICRC, the action of a civilian must meet three cumulative 
requirements in order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities: 
 
1. “The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity 
of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction 
on persons or objects protected against attack (threshold of harm), and  
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either 
from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an 
integral part (direct causation), and 
3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm 
in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent 
nexus).”401 
 
A clear example of “acts of war” that amounts to DPH is where civilians use means of 
warfare "to commit acts of violence against human or material enemy forces,"402 for instance 
in cases where a civilian conducts – or intends to conduct – armed attacks through an UAV.403 
However, the term "acts of war" goes beyond mere violent conduct.404 In the word of the 
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ICRC, the act reaches the threshold if it is "likely to affect adversely military operations or 
military capacity."405 An example is the loading of bombs onto a military aircraft that is about 
to engage in hostilities.406  
 
Moreover, the act must qualify as a direct cause to the actual or intended harm. What is 
decisive is whether it is likely that the act in question "is brought about in one causal step",407 
also where the act only cause the harm "in conjunction with other acts."408 On the contrary, 
indirect participation in hostilities is not sufficient to qualify as "acts of violence which pose 
an immediate threat of actual harm to the adverse party."409 Examples of such indirect 
participation may be the "selling of goods to one or more of the armed parties, expressing 
sympathy for the cause of one of the parties […] failing to act to prevent an incursion by one 
of the armed parties"410 or merely developing the software meant for an AWS.411 Moreover, 
the Commentary on the HPCR Manual describes acts below the threshold as those  
 
"that merely build or maintain the capacity of a Belligerent Party to harm its adversary in 
unspecified future operations […] even if they are connected to the resulting harm through an 
uninterrupted chain of events or are indispensable to its causation".412  
 
Finally, the civilian has to act with an aim to support a party of the conflict to the other 
party’s disadvantage. According to the HPCR Manual, this "relates to the objective purpose 
and design of an act or operation as part of the conduct of hostilities and does not depend on 
the subjective mindset or intent of every participating individual."413 
 
Various scholars have sought to identify the role civilians may play in relation to AWS. 
According to Boothby, civilian personnel may be involved in "planning the mission, in pre-
sorting servicing of the platform, in loading the platform with mission essential data, fuel, and 
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ordnance, in moving the platform to the place from which it deploys or is launched, in 
developing the software that the platform uses for navigation and target recognition and in 
feeding into the platform the characteristics of the target of which it is to search and the area 
where it is to search.”414  
 
According to Sannem and Skøyeneie, one can assume that the programming of an AWS 
amounts to DPH.415 This contention corresponds with the HPCR Manual Rule (xi), which 
holds that "[l]oading mission control data to military aircraft/missile software systems" is an 
example of an act which may qualify as DPH.416 Moreover, the HPCR Manual identifies the 
acts of "engaging in mission planning of an air or missile attack"417 and "operating or 
controlling weapon systems […] in air or missile combat operations, including remote control 
of UAVs and UCAVs".418 Thus, a temporal or geographic proximity is not necessary in order 
for an act to qualify as DPH.419 
 
However, the topic discussed in this section is highly controversial, and, as the HPCR Manual 
points out, the criteria established by the ICRC Interpretive Guidance are not customary law. 
It nevertheless seems safe to conclude that civilians who play a crucial role in the preparation, 
programming or operation of an AWS during a military operation against an adversary will be 
regarded as DPH and thus lose their protection. 
 
4.4.1.2. Compliance with the principle of proportionality when an attack is conducted 
with autonomous weapon systems 
 
The proportionality principle provides a further restriction upon the adversaries in cases 
where the armed forces have identified a military objective, but where there is a risk of 
incidental civilian losses or damage to civilian property.420 Although none of the IHL treaties 
contain a statutory definition of the principle, it is reflected in, inter alia, AP I Articles 
51(5)(b) and 57(2)(iii). According to these provisions, the following conduct is prohibited due 
to the proportionality principle: 
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"An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."421 
 
As the term 'proportionality' suggests, the consideration requires some sort of balancing 
between two needs. These are, on the one side, the need to eliminate a lawful military 
objective, which is a justified act of war. On the other side, there is the need to protect 
civilians to the degree required by IHL. The principle is codified in treaty provisions and have 
status as customary law.422  
 
The question that must be assessed before a military engagement is thus whether the civilian 
losses or damages to property will be disproportionate in comparison with the expected 
military advantages. The key consideration is whether the harm to civilians is “excessive”.  
This notion invites to an interpretation which is largely left to those planning an attack.423 As 
the term does not have a clearly limited scope, it is consequently open to subjective 
assessment and balancing.424 Furthermore, the military enjoys a wide margin of appreciation 
because of the prognostic character of the assessment.425  
Although the proportionality test is accepted as customary law, the above-mentioned 
observations related to the principle of precautions in attack and the distinction principle 
indicate that its substantive content varies to a large extent due to the interpreter. Thus, the 
outcome of the assessment is not objectively predictable.  
 
This may be different if the adversaries use pre-programmed AWS, in so far the parameters 
are sufficiently advanced. States could for instance minimize the incidental harm if they 
programmed the AWS to cancel or suspend an attack if it, through implemented sensors, were 
able to calculate that a number of people surrounding a military objective which exceeded a 
pre-programmed number of accepted casualties.  
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comparison between the expected incidental harm and the expected military advantage does not necessarily lend 
itself to empirical analyses”. 




Moreover, if the AWS is equipped with sensors and is able to fly low and loiter over an area 
for a longer time, it may be able to gather valuable information about the target enabling the 
AWS to identify both the signature of the target and, if it is a combatant, his or hers 
movement pattern. Thus, the AWS could be able to time an attack and avoid civilian 
casualties to a larger extent than a human, especially in IACs where the adversary is easily 




Lawful use of AWS presupposes that the target process in subject to meaningful human 
control and that the programmer/those in charge of an attack ensure that the AWS conducts its 
mission in compliance with the relevant rules of IHL and IHRL – hereunder to identify the 
target and ensure that it is a military objective.426  
The decision to attack is not taken in the moment by an operator. Therefore, the employment 
of AWS may pose new challenges in regard of planning and the incidental targeting process. 
For instance, a common feature to all the obligations within the principle of precautions in 
attack is that they rely on subjective judgment. The three most imminent principles, which 
AWS are also less likely to comply with without human intervention and oversight, are the 
principles of military necessity/advantage, distinction and proportionality. Thus, interational 
actors conclude that a human must take the required precautions and have meaningful control 
over the AWS’ behavior during a military operation in order to comply with the principles of 
distinction and proportionality.427 This seems to be coherent with the view of the U.S. as well 
as other states, since existing AWS are not capable to apply IHL without human pre-
programming and/or intervention during military operations. 
 
In order to prevent that the development of advanced technology runs afoul with IHL and to 
secure compliance with the relevant rules, states ought to scrutinize AWS in a detailed and 
effective manner. IHL contains a rule which obliges states to do so, which will be the subject 
under examination in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                        
426 Commentary on the APs, p. 680 para 2194. 
427  Johansen, S. R. and Slensvik, T. (2016), p. 152-153. 
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5. The obligation to conduct weapon reviews  
 
Although IHL mainly applies after armed conflict has broken out, some of the rules of IHL 
oblige the states to implement procedures and initiate measures in peacetime. One example is 
weapons review under AP I Article 36, which states as follows: 
 
"In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or methods of 
warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment 
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of 
international law applicable to the High Contracting Party."  
 
The rule is binding upon all the 174 parties to AP I,428 and is arguably customary international 
law as well. Although there is not comprehensive state practice to support this view,429 some 
legal experts argue in this direction.430 According to Boothby, the St. Petersburg Declaration 
from 1868 indicated that states ought to conduct a weapons review due to the following 
wording: 
 
“The Contracting or Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to come hereafter to an 
understanding whenever a precise proposition shall be drawn up in view of future 
improvements which science may effect in the armament of troops, in order to maintain the 
principles which they have established, and to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws 
of humanity.”431 
 
Furthermore, Hague Convention IV Article 1 states that “[t]he Contracting Powers shall issue 
instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations 
respecting the laws and customs of war on land.”432 As mentioned above, Article 23(e) in this 
convention prohibits the employment of weapons “calculates to cause unnecessary suffering.”  
Hays Parks – as cited by Boothby – concludes that “states have a general duty to engage in 
good faith performance of their treaty obligations and that ’[t]his would have included a duty 
                                                        
428 See the overview of state parties here: https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470 (last entered May 3, 2016). 
429 Boothby (2014), page 171. 
430 According to Boothby, it is "highly likely" that this is the case, see Boothby (2014), p. 170-171. 
431 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. 
Saint Petersburg, 29 November/11 December 1868, Preamble, final passage. 
432 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907. 
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to ensure [that] military weapons and munitions complied with the Hague Convention IV and 
obligations contained in other treaties.’”433 Furthermore, the ICRC has stated a similar view. 
In a weapons review guide from 2006,434 the organization held that "[t]he requirement that the 
legality of all new weapons, means and methods of warfare be systematically assessed is 
arguably one that applies to all States, regardless of whether or not they are party to [AP I]”. 
The faithful and responsible application of its international law obligations would require a 
State to ensure that the new weapons, means and methods it develops or acquires will not 
violate these obligations."435 As mentioned in section 1.2.1, states must interpret their treaty 
obligations in good faith. In this respect, it seems reasonable to assume that compliance with 
rules prohibiting or restricting weapons demands that states make sure that weapons in their 
arsenal are lawful and whether their use is somehow restricted.  
 
According to the Commentary, Article 36 was codified “with a primary concern directed 
towards the technological development of armaments.” 436 The drafters also stressed that 
Article 36 – together with the CCW and the Hague Regulation – were "the only instrument in 
the law of armed conflict that [could] act as a brake on the abuses resulting from the arms race 
or on the possibility of future abuses".437 In addition, the drafters alerted that "[t]he use of 
long distance, remote control weapons, or weapons connected to sensors positioned in the 
field, leads to the automation of the battlefield in which the soldier plays an increasingly less 
important role."438 As weapons are increasingly equipped with automatic and autonomous 
features, their presumption has proven to be right. Consequently, the relevance of Article 36 
is perhaps larger than ever, and the importance of its obligation should not be overseen by 
contracting states. 
 
                                                        
433 Hays Parks (2005), p. 55-57 as cited by Boothby (2014), p. 170-171. 
434 Lawand, K., Coupland, R. and Herby, P. (2006), A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and 
Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, Geneva: International 
Committee of the Red Cross. 
435 Lawand, K., Coupland, R. and Herby, P. (2006), A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and 
Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, Geneva: International 
Committee of the Red Cross. page 933. 
436 Commentary on the APs, page 428 paragraph 1478.  
437 Commentary on the APs, page 427 paragraph 1475. 
438 Commentary on the APs, page 427 paragraph 1476. The Additional Protocols and the Commentary were 
written in a time where some states started to deploy UAVs. For instance, Iran performed the first known use of 
UCAVs in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, see Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare, 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Policy Focus #87, September 2008), page 17. 
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The subjects of review, namely "weapons, means and methods of warfare", are not defined in 
neither AP I nor the Commentary. The terms must be seen in relation to IHL as a whole, and 
interpreted in a way that promote the provision's object and purpose.  
 
5.1. Application of Article 36  
 
The obligation to determine whether the employment of a new weapon, means or method of 
warfare is prohibited under IHL applies once a state begins to study, develop, acquire or adopt 
one of the above mentioned. Here, the notion "new" does not mean that the weapon, mean or 
method in question must be new in a technical sense – it suffices that it is new in relation to 
the arsenal of a contracting state.439  
 
According to the Commentary, activation of Article 36 requires more than a mere study of 
technology that perhaps will become weaponized. Since the line between a study of 
technology and a study of a mean of warfare can be difficult to draw, Boothby suggests that 
this depends on "when particular kinds of weaponisation are first being considered or 
evaluated."440  
 
Development of means or methods of warfare includes "the application of materials, 
equipment and other elements to form a weapon", while "acquisition and adoption [of means 
of warfare] involve obtaining weapons from commercial terms, as a gift, or under any other 
form of transaction."441 In regard of methods of warfare, "adoption" refers to a state's decision 
to employ a certain weapon or method in armed conflict.442 
 
According to the Commentary, the objective of Article 36 is to oblige states to review 
whether the normal or expected use of weapons may be restricted or prohibited. Mere 
possession in itself will arguably not activate Article 36.443 It is, however, hard to imagine 
that a state which possesses a weapon will never use it; as shown in the Nuclear Weapons 
case, states are probably not prohibited from using nuclear weapons in extreme cases of self-
defence. Although self-defence is generally connected to the jus ad bellum-paradigm, the use 
                                                        
439 Commentary on the APs, page 425 paragraph 1472. 
440 Boothby, W. (2014), page 109. 
441 Ibid. 
442 Ibid. 
443 Commentary on the APs, page 425 paragraph 1469 and 1471. 
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of force must “also meet the requirements of the law of armed conflict which comprise in 
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”444 Hence, if a state equips itself with 
controversial weapons as, for instance, a method of deterrence, it ought to examine its legality 
to ensure compliance with Article 36 and IHL in general. Such an obligations follows from 
the wording of Article 36 as well: At one point, the state must necessarily either study, 
develop, acquire or adopt the weapon. Consequently, Article 36 is activated.  
 
5.2. The obligation to determine the legality of autonomous weapon systems  
 
Once the above mentioned requirements are fulfilled, the question is how states ought to 
conduct the review and determine the legality of new weapons, means and methods of 
warfare. Article 36 contains little information as to how states actually ought to conduct the 
weapon review. There are, however, some leads. For instance, contracting parties must 
consider whether the subject is prohibited "in all or some circumstances" by any applicable 
international law. Hence, it is likely that the drafters wanted the states to undertake a broad 
examination of their new weapons, means and methods of warfare.  
 
Moreover, the Commentary clarifies that "the determination is to be made on the basis of 
normal use of the weapon as anticipated at the time of evaluation."445 Such a rule harmonizes 
with the contention that IHL “prohibits the design, modification, or employment of a weapon 
for the purpose of increasing or causing suffering beyond that required by military 
necessity.”446 This point is especially relevant in relation to weapons and means of warfare, as 
there is an unavoidable possibility that states may use them in an unlawful manner.  
 
The Commentary also explains that the provision "implies the obligation to establish internal 
procedures for the purpose of elucidating the issue of legality."447 There are no descriptions as 
to how these internal procedures ought to be conducted, so the states are given much leeway 
when they perform the review. As far as I am aware, only six states have established such 
internal procedures. 448 Thus, the state practice is not sufficient in order to establish a 
                                                        
444 Nuclear Weapons case, para. 42. 
445 Commentary on the APs, page 423 paragraph 1466. 
446 Corn et.al. (2012), p. 204. 
447 Commentary on the APs, paragraph 1470 and 1482. 
448 The respective states are Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the U.S., see Lawand, K., 
Coupland, R. and Herby, P. (2006), A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of 
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customary rule demanding specific forms of review or procedures that must be adopted in this 
regard.449  
 
The U.S. provides an example of such an internal procedure. Here, legal experts carry out an 
examination on a national level, which in turn allows the armed forces to assume that the 
weapon or munition in use is legal in this particular aspect.450 These experts determine 
whether a mean of warfare violates the prohibition of weapons causing unnecessary suffering 
through an examination of “the doctrine and instructions for its employment and the effects 
intended to be (and actually) produced.”451 The weapon or munition in question “must be 
examined against comparable weapons in use on the modern battlefield, their effects on 
combatants, and [its] military necessity.”452 Norway has a similar procedure, although there 
are no examples on conducted reviews that are available.453   
 
According to Article 36, the state ought to determine whether a weapon, mean or method of 
warfare is prohibited under API or "by any other rule of international law applicable to the 
High Contracting Party." The question is whether a prohibition can be deduced from human 
rights law, either solely or seen together with international humanitarian law. 
 
As already mentioned, states ought to conduct a broad examination of the legality of a 
subject. However, human rights obligations were written with an eye on the law enforcement 
paradigm, and not the conduct of hostilities paradigm.454 One can perhaps argue on this basis 
that it was not the ordinary meaning of Article 36 to imply human rights law in the evaluation 
of weapons, means and methods of warfare. Yet, it is generally accepted that human rights 
continues to apply during armed conflict. Thus, a dynamic approach to the object and purpose 
of Article 36 may suggest that the review must include relevant human rights as well. For 
instance, Heyns holds that autonomous weapon systems may "pose new threats to the right to 
                                                        
Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, Geneva: International Committee 
of the Red Cross, p. 5. 
449 Boothby, W. (2014), page 171. 
450 Corn et.al. (2012), p. 204. 
451 Ibid. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Direktiv om folkerettslig vurdering av vapen, krigforingsmetoder og krigforingsvirkemidler, (Directive on the 
Legal Review on Weapons, Methods and Means of Warfare), Ministry of Defence, 18 June 2003. 
454 Fleck, D. (2013), p. 72. 
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life."455 Moreover, some argue that such weapon systems will probably not be able to meet 
the requirements of neither humanitarian- nor human rights law, and that in any case; they 
should not be given the power to take life-or-death decisions.456 
 
However, the Commentary explains that the clause "any other rule of international law" refers 
to "any agreement related to the prohibition, limitation or restriction on the use of weapon or a 
particular type of weapon, concluded by this Party, which would relate, for example to a new 
generation of small caliber weapons or any other type of weapons."457 In addition, customary 
rules are included.458 If we take the Commentary by its wording, it seems that the reference to 
other rules of international law is reserved to weapons law and law of targeting. Such an 
interpretation implies that the states must only assess humanitarian law. However, as human 
rights increasingly become an integral part of humanitarian law, I will not exclude the 
possibility that states may be obliged to evaluate human rights law in certain circumstances.  
 
5.3. Preliminary conclusion: Review of autonomous weapon systems  
 
Article 36 is clearly important when assessing of the legality of AWS. This has come to show 
due to the CCW Meetings of Experts on LAWS in 2014, 2015 and 2016. In the 2015 meeting, 
the discussion of Article 36 was placed under the heading "Possible challenges to IHL"459 and 
introduced by William H. Boothby. Under his presentation, he stressed that "[t]he legal duty 
is to check that the planned use of the weapon or method will comply with all of the 
international law rules binding upon [the parties to AP I]". Thus, a state that plans to 
manufacture or purchase460 AWS must assess whether the planned use of the weapon is legal 
before they deploy it. Consequently, if such review is not undertaken, the state will be 
responsible where the weapon causes wrongful damage.461 
 
                                                        
455 Heyns, C., Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
A/HRC/23/47, April 2013, para 30. 
456 Heyns, C., Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
A/HRC/23/47, April 2013, para 31. 
457 Commentary on the APs, para 1472. 
458 Ibid. 
459 The program of the CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems at the United Nations 
Office at Geneva's official webpage: 
http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/6ce049be22ec75a2c1257c8d00513e26?OpenDocume
nt&ExpandSection=3#_Section3 (last entered 16 December 2015).  
460 Commentary on the APs, page 426 paragraph 1473. 
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6. Final remarks  
 
The common international position seem to be that AWS in general are legal means of 
warfare. However, as current AWS do not contain such levels of complexity, there seem to be 
agreement among international actors that the engagement must have some sort of meaningful 
human control in order to ensure compliance with the relevant rules. However, there are no 
existing authoritative agreement on the notion of human control, and thus the constraint is 
vulnerable to changes in the states’ will to comply with it. Furthermore, technology is steadily 
advancing and human control will perhaps not be necessary if AWS become sufficiently 
intelligent to comply with IHL autonomously.  
 
States are addressing the issues related to AWS through the CCW Expert Meetings, and the 
dialogue has lasted for three years now. Whether the discussions will result in an agreement is 
a question beyond my knowledge, but the topic is at least put on the agenda and states share 
their views and experiences. Thus, the technological development does not progress in a 
vacuum.  
 
Furthermore, there will be challenges in the future relating to many aspects of AWS. Some 
are addressed in this thesis, like the question of extraterritorial application of human rights 
obligations and whether the use of AWS may be in violation of the prohibition against 
inhuman or degrading treatment. Moreover, there are issues related to the relationship 
between humans and AWS when it comes to proper identification of military objectives and 
thus lawful targets. These issues should be properly addressed though a weapons review by 
every state who is considering to take AWS into their arsenal. 
 
Moreover, other topics are relevant if the human in taken out of the loop. For instance, one 
may have to consider whether FAWS with AI should be regarded as independent legal 
subjects under IHL, and thus have the same duties and entitlements as combatants. 
Furthermore, questions concerning responsibility for acts or omissions conducted by AWS 
deserve a throughout examination. Although I have not addressed these issues in this thesis, 
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